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Rethinking Family-Court Prosecutors:
Elected and Agency Prosecutors and
Prosecutorial Discretion in Juvenile
Delinquency and Child Protection Cases
Josh Gupta-Kagan†
Like criminal prosecutors, family-court prosecutors have immense power. Determining which cases to prosecute and which to divert or dismiss goes to the heart
of the delinquency system’s balance between punishment and rehabilitation of children and the child protection system’s spectrum of family interventions. For instance, the 1990s shift to prosecute (rather than dismiss or divert) about 10 percent
more delinquency cases annually is as significant a development as any other. Yet
scholars have not examined the legal structures for these charging decisions or
family-court prosecutors’ authority in much depth.
This Article shows how family-court prosecutors’ roles have never been fully
theorized. Family courts historically avoided prosecutors (or lawyers of any kind).
When children’s and parents’ lawyers appeared in the 1960s to 1970s, family-court
prosecutors soon followed, but without any consensus about how they should make
charging decisions or how their authority intersects with agencies or intake officers.
This Article provides the first detailed description and critique of the varying state
laws governing family-court prosecutors.
This Article argues that family-court prosecutors should work for and represent juvenile justice or child protection agencies, which should have authority to determine which cases to file. Agencies are best suited to balance the competing interests at stake in family-court cases and to choose specific cases on which to focus their
limited resources. Agency control over intake could reduce delinquency prosecutions
for relatively low-level offenses, which have particularly large racial disparities. Finally, an agency model should lead to limited judicial review of decisions to prosecute cases—a long-elusive goal in scholarship regarding criminal prosecutors.
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Kentucky College of Law and Duke Law School’s 2015 conference on civil rights, “The
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Gerrity for excellent research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
The law and the academy have long recognized criminal prosecutors’ immense power, especially the power to determine which
cases to prosecute and which not to. Less attention has been focused on related issues in juvenile delinquency and child protection cases litigated in state family courts.1 There, determining
which cases to prosecute and which to divert2 or dismiss goes to
the heart of the delinquency system’s overall balance between
punishment and rehabilitation of children, and the child protection system’s spectrum of interventions in families.
Family-court prosecutors are lawyers who prosecute delinquency and civil child protection3 cases on behalf of the state in
family court. They are worthy of special study because they
should operate differently than criminal prosecutors, especially
when it comes to their exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and
because these differences have tremendous policy implications for

1
Different states apply different names to the courts that handle juvenile delinquency and civil child protection cases. For ease of reference, I refer to these as family
courts unless referring to a source that uses a different term.
2
“Diversion” refers to the handling of a case outside of a formal court proceeding.
In juvenile delinquency cases, children are typically referred for some kinds of services
and are not prosecuted if they comply with the recommended services. In child protection
cases, child protection agencies supervise a family and refer family members for services.
3
The term “prosecutor” has been long used in juvenile delinquency cases, but less
so in child protection cases, though it is apt in both contexts. As Professor Douglas J.
Besharov explained regarding child protection cases (in language equally applicable to
delinquency cases):

While the rehabilitative orientation of child protection proceedings should be
preserved, it is a mistake to ignore, or deny, the essentially prosecutorial function of the attorneys who assist petitioners. First, the preparation and presentation of child abuse and child neglect cases often require hard nosed prosecutorial
methods. Field investigations, in cooperation with the police as well as the child
protection agency, may be needed. Recalcitrant witnesses may have to be identified and pressured into telling what they know. Opposing witnesses may have
to be cross-examined effectively. . . . Second, the benign purposes of child protective proceedings should not obscure the fact that they may result in a major
intrusion into family life. . . . [Such a proceeding] “by its very nature resembles
a criminal prosecution. The defendant is charged with conduct—failure to care
properly for her children—which may be criminal and which in any event is
viewed as reprehensible and morally wrong by a majority of society.”
Douglas J. Besharov, The “Civil” Prosecution of Child Abuse and Neglect, 6 Vt L Rev 403,
408–09 (1981), quoting Meltzer v C. Buck LeCraw & Co, 402 US 954, 959 (1971) (Black
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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the juvenile justice and child protection systems. These systems
balance protection of individuals and accountability for offenders
with an overriding focus on rehabilitation of offenders—so children who have committed crimes do not reoffend and so adults
who have abused or neglected their children can safely maintain
or regain custody over them. In family court, the state should file
and prosecute a case only when both (1) the facts necessary to
support family-court jurisdiction exist (that a child has committed a delinquent act or that a parent or custodian has abused or
neglected a child) and (2) family-court jurisdiction—rather than
a less coercive intervention—is necessary to achieve the protective or rehabilitative goals. Charging decisions in delinquency
and child protection cases thus differ from criminal cases, in
which retributive and deterrence goals predominate and rehabilitation is not a large factor.
Reflecting these different goals, both juvenile justice and
child protection law have assigned important roles to administrative agencies that do not have an analog in criminal law. These
agencies provide for rehabilitative services and supervise children and families. They often manage a spectrum of services—
from those offered to children and intact families in diversion programs to custodial placements for children ordered into foster
care or secure juvenile facilities.
These different goals and the administrative agencies created
to further them lead to structural questions that have been
largely ignored in the academic literature. Should family-court
prosecutors work for elected prosecutors, for those administrative
agencies, or for some other entity? Should the prosecutors or the
agencies have authority to make charging decisions—known in
family-court parlance as intake? States have reached divergent
conclusions on these questions. Some state child protection agencies determine which cases to file and have their agency attorneys
prosecute those cases (eight states), some agencies decide which
cases to file but are represented by lawyers from local prosecutors’
offices or other executive-branch agencies (twenty-five states),
and some child protection agencies must instead work with other
executive-branch attorneys who represent “the state” or “the people” more broadly and hold the final authority over which cases
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to file (eleven states and the District of Columbia).4 Juvenile delinquency prosecutors more consistently (though still with exceptions) have formal authority over which cases to file. But states
vary in the balance of power between juvenile prosecutors and
departments of juvenile justice or probation that employ intake
officers to evaluate possible delinquency cases; some states give
prosecutors complete control (thirteen states), some require intake officers to make recommendations to prosecutors (nine
states), some authorize intake officers to divert cases subject to
prosecutors’ review (eight states and the District of Columbia),
and others authorize intake officers to divert cases regardless of
prosecutors’ views.5
This variability results from a history unique to family
courts, which originally provided lawyers to neither the state nor
respondent children and parents.6 State laws empowered private
individuals to file petitions alleging that a child was delinquent,
abused, or neglected.7 Court-employed intake or probation officers
would determine which cases would be diverted and which would
be prosecuted.
The regular use of family-court prosecutors developed with
the growth of the administrative state and the Supreme Court’s
decision in In re Gault,8 which granted juvenile delinquency defendants the right to counsel.9 Child protection agencies took on
a larger role in intake decisions, determining in many states
which cases they believed did not require court intervention. In
delinquency cases, family-court prosecutors were initially envisioned as carrying out the original vision of juvenile justice, filing
cases only when the facts and the child’s circumstances suggested
doing so would further the court’s rehabilitative purposes. But
4
See Part III.B. As described in Part III.B, two states authorize both agencies and
elected prosecutors’ offices to initiate cases, and three states assign important roles to
court intake officers.
5
See Part III.A. As described in Part III.A, one state gives authority to both prosecutors and intake officers to divert cases, and two states are outliers.
6
Some states permitted family courts to “request” an appearance by the district
attorney—language implying the unusual nature of such appearances. See, for example,
HB 153 § 63, 1959 Or Laws 719, 739, codified at Or Rev Stat § 8.685(1). Some of these
statutes were later expanded to give prosecutors an “entitle[ment]” to appear. See, for
example, HB 3449 § 4, 1991 Or Laws 1279, 1280, codified at Or Rev Stat § 8.685(3).
7
State laws used various terms, including “dependent” children. For ease of reference, I use “delinquent” to refer to children alleged to have committed acts that would be
crimes if done by an adult, and “abuse and neglect” to refer to acts done by parents or
custodians in violation of states’ civil child protection laws.
8
387 US 1 (1967).
9
Id at 41.
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when juvenile crime rates increased and states responded with
various tough-on-crime reforms, prosecutors took a more punitive
approach. This shift, as much as any other reform, shaped the
more punitive modern juvenile justice system, increasing the proportion of cases prosecuted rather than diverted or dismissed—
an increase that remains to this day.
This Article argues that family-court prosecutors should be
attorneys employed by and representing comprehensive juvenile
justice or child protection agencies. This structure would empower agencies, counseled by their lawyers, to determine which
cases to file. Agencies are best suited to balance the competing
interests at stake in family-court cases, especially compared to
elected prosecutors, who are more likely to overemphasize punitive responses to juvenile crime and child abuse and neglect.
Nonlawyer agency staff are trained in child development and
family dynamics and are better positioned than lawyers to distinguish the children and families who need court intervention from
those who could benefit from other interventions. Comprehensive
agencies are also best situated to understand the various resources available for children and families and how those resources are best deployed.
In juvenile justice, agency control over intake could reduce
family-court prosecutions for relatively low-level offenses, especially those arising at school. Such cases form an important part
of the school-to-prison pipeline and have particularly large racial
disparities. Through a better understanding of adolescent development and available interventions short of family-court prosecutions, a better balancing of punitive and rehabilitative goals, and
a desire to focus limited agency resources on more severe offenders, comprehensive juvenile justice agencies are more likely than
elected prosecutors to conclude that the juvenile justice system’s
goals are better served through greater use of diversion.10
An agency model lends itself to limited judicial review of decisions to prosecute individual cases. The absence of meaningful
judicial review is a central challenge to reforming the power of
criminal prosecutors—and there is no easy answer to that challenge. But if child protection and juvenile justice agencies are

10 That shift could also have upstream effects on arrest patterns and familycourt referrals. See Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in
Communities of Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 Cornell
L Rev 383, 430 (2013).
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charged with exercising prosecutorial discretion, they ought to establish standards to do so consistent with their rehabilitative
statutory purposes, and failure to follow such standards should
lead a court to dismiss the resulting petition. Such modest judicial
checks can ensure that charging decisions at least consider family
courts’ rehabilitative purposes while still generally deferring to
executive-branch charging discretion. That result would help
guard against the phenomenon of child protection agencies removing too many children as a way to overcompensate in response to a child’s death.11 It would also bring some standards
that predate Gault—the family court’s authority in some states
to dismiss a case “for social reasons”12—into a more modern
administrative-law framework.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the relevant academic literature regarding prosecutorial discretion in
family court, the role of criminal prosecutors, and the role of lawyers for government agencies. Part II explores the history of
family-court prosecutors and intake decisions, from the origins of
the family court through Gault and the post-Gault evolution of
family-court prosecutors, and identifies the absence of consistent
theoretical underpinnings of that role. Part III surveys current
law and identifies significant variations across jurisdictions, regarding both who employs family-court prosecutors and their
power as compared with juvenile justice and child protection
agencies. Part IV argues why family-court prosecutors should
represent and be employed by agencies rather than prosecutors’
offices, explores how an agency model can lead to judicial review
of charging decisions, and addresses concerns that may be raised
about an agency model.
I. FAMILY-COURT PROSECUTORS AND PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION
Family-court prosecutors have received remarkably little examination, from the emergence of such prosecutors in the years
after Gault (a period discussed in detail in Part II) to the variety
11 See, for example, Martin Guggenheim, Book Review, Somebody’s Children:
Sustaining the Family’s Place in Child Welfare Policy, 113 Harv L Rev 1716, 1725–26
(2000). See also Jill Lepore, Baby Doe: A Political History of Tragedy (New Yorker, Feb 1,
2016), online at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/02/01/baby-doe (visited Dec
15, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (describing the “policy pendulum” that swings between family preservation and removal, especially after child deaths).
12 See text accompanying note 365.
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of current statutory structures defining these prosecutors’ role
(detailed in Part III). This Part explains the topic’s importance
and places it in a broader context. While there has been little
study of family-court prosecutors, there is a significant literature
about the specific importance of family-court intake decisions,
and more generally about how the government chooses when and
how to file litigation.
A.

Prosecutorial Discretion in Family Court

Determining which delinquency and child protection cases to
prosecute, and which to handle through a variety of other means,
is an essential feature of both our delinquency and child protection systems, and is arguably the “most critical stage.”13 That decision determines which children can be removed from their families and placed in state custody. This Section establishes the
tremendous importance of those decisions, known in family-court
jargon as “intake.”
1. Juvenile delinquency intake decisions.
The juvenile delinquency system has long featured intake decisions intended to review all cases to determine both their legal
sufficiency and whether prosecution would serve the juvenile justice system’s rehabilitative goals.14 The decision when to use diversion programs and when to prosecute children has been an essential feature of the juvenile justice system since diversion
programs were established soon after its inception.15 Prosecution,
of course, requires a trial or plea, and an adjudication requires a
judge to determine that evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
proves the child’s guilt.16 Only such a finding can justify committing a child to a juvenile justice agency, requiring a child to comply with probation conditions, or imposing the various collateral
13 Matter of Reis, 7 Crim L Rptr (BNA) 2151, 2152 (RI Fam 1970). Family-court prosecutors make a range of other crucial decisions. In juvenile delinquency cases, these include whether to seek to detain children pretrial, what specific charges to file, whether to
seek waiver of more serious charges, and which dispositions to recommend. In child protection cases, these include whether to seek pretrial removal or foster care of a child, what
specific forms of abuse or neglect to allege, and which dispositions to recommend. I focus
on the charging decision both for simplicity and for its decisive importance.
14 See, for example, Wallace Waalkes, Juvenile Court Intake—a Unique and
Valuable Tool, 10 Crime & Delinq 117, 119–20 (1964), cited in William H. Sheridan,
Standards for Juvenile and Family Courts 53 (Children’s Bureau 1966).
15 See text accompanying notes 84–90.
16 See In re Winship, 397 US 358, 367–68 (1970).
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consequences of a juvenile conviction on a child.17 Diversion programs, in contrast, provide some kind of intervention short of
court action.18 There is thus no trial, no conviction, no risk of detention, less stigma imposed, and none of the collateral consequences that flow from a conviction, and diversion therefore generally “is considered more desirable for youth.”19 It is a less
expensive intervention than prosecution, and thus also provides
benefits to the state.20
Choosing diversion rather than prosecution is a central feature of the juvenile justice system. Nationally, in 2013, authorities prosecuted a slight majority—55 percent—of all delinquency
cases referred to family court.21 Authorities referred children to
some kind of diversion program for 27 percent of cases, while 18
percent were dismissed.22 During the 1990s, when a variety of
tough-on-crime reforms occurred, the proportion of prosecutions
spiked about 10 percent and then leveled off at its current rate.23
But scholars have not closely examined how evolving family-court
intake decisionmaking structures—especially the increasing authority of prosecutors—have shaped this trend.24
The decision whether to divert a case also has long-term importance to achieving the juvenile delinquency system’s goal of

17 For a list of common collateral consequences, see South Carolina Commission on
Indigent Defense, The South Carolina Juvenile Collateral Consequences Checklist *2–3
(Aug 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/6WLL-DHRE.
18 The precise definition of “diversion” remains contested. Professor Daniel P. Mears,
for instance, offers four possible definitions. See Daniel P. Mears, The Front End of
Juvenile Court: Intake and Informal versus Formal Processing, in Donna M. Bishop and
Barry C. Feld, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Juvenile Crime and Juvenile Justice 573, 594
(Oxford 2011). I use the term consistent with Mears’s third definition, as “any effort aimed
at ensuring that less serious cases are turned away from the juvenile justice system to
receive services or treatment from some other agency or organization,” which Mears described as “provid[ing] the clearest foothold for describing” diversion. Id.
19 US Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the St. Louis
County Family Court *44 (July 31, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/QY68-N733. But see
Tamar R. Birckhead, Closing the Widening Net: The Rights of Juveniles at Intake, 46 Tex
Tech L Rev 157, 163–64 (2013) (listing critiques of diversion).
20 See Birckhead, 46 Tex Tech L Rev at 163 (cited in note 19).
21 US Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
Delinquency Cases in Juvenile Court, 2013 *3–4 (Oct 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/C9GX-44GY.
22 See id.
23 See text accompanying notes 187–91.
24 See Mears, The Front End of Juvenile Court at 576 (cited in note 18) (“[F]ew studies have examined whether greater prosecutorial involvement at intake changes how
youth are processed.”).
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rehabilitating youth and reducing future crime. Although the evidence does not make a definitive case, the National Research
Council concluded in 2015 that there is “a small, and somewhat
inconsistent, negative effect [on recidivism] from juvenile justice
system processing compared with diversion at the point of initial
referral.”25 That is, prosecuting rather than diverting a child may
lead to increased recidivism over time. A more recent study found
that decisions to prosecute children for their first offense are “associated with higher levels of re-offending, particularly for less
serious first offenses.”26 Decisions to prosecute children may also
impose other significant harms. Professor Gary Sweeten found
that “first-time official intervention during high school, particularly court appearance, increases the odds of high school dropout
by at least a factor of three.”27
Juvenile delinquency intake decisions exacerbate racial disparities in the juvenile justice system. Nationally, black children
are more than 2.4 times as likely as white children to be referred
to family court.28 That high rate of disproportionality makes arrest and referral “the decision that is most significant to the total
level of disproportionality.”29 Racial disparities are particularly
evident in lower-level offenses—which are more likely to be on the
margins of decisions to prosecute. Professor Kristin Henning has

25 Richard J. Bonnie, et al, eds, Reforming Juvenile Justice: A Developmental
Approach 150 (National Academies 2013).
26 David E. Barrett and Antonis Katsiyannis, The Clemson Juvenile Delinquency
Project: Major Findings from a Multi-agency Study, 26 J Child & Fam Stud 2050, 2051
(2017). The study found one exception to this finding: youth who were “diagnosed with an
aggression-related mental disorder.” Id at 2051–52.
27 Gary Sweeten, Who Will Graduate? Disruption of High School Education by
Arrest and Court Involvement, 23 Just Q 462, 463, 474 (2006) (emphasis added).
Sweeten found that an arrest—even without a court appearance—reduces the likelihood
of high school graduation, and an arrest followed by a decision to prosecute reduces that
likelihood significantly more. “Put another way, first-time arrest during high school
nearly doubles the odds of high school dropout, while a court appearance nearly quadruples the odds of dropout.” Id at 473. See also id at 463, 466 (noting earlier research
reaching similar conclusions).
28 A 2015 DOJ investigation reported that black children nationally are 2.4 times as
likely to be referred to family court. Investigation of the St. Louis County Family Court at
*39–40 (cited in note 19). This racial gap is even larger in some urban areas—black children are 4.8 times as likely to be referred to family court than white children in counties
deemed to be peers of St. Louis County (based on population size, poverty levels, population density, and other factors). Id.
29 Sarah E. Redfield and Jason P. Nance, School-to-Prison Pipeline Preliminary
Report *43 (ABA, Feb 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/K8WF-PFEA. Professors Sarah
E. Redfield and Jason P. Nance add that the relative arrest rate by race has remained
fairly stable since 1990. Id at *44.
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shown how children of color are particularly vulnerable to prosecution for low-level offenses.30 South Carolina statistics for one
such offense illustrate the point. Black children account for 33
percent of all South Carolina children31 but nearly 60 percent of
all children referred to South Carolina family court in delinquency cases.32 The disparities are even more stark for the misdemeanor charge of disturbing schools—the crime of “interfer[ing]
with or [ ] disturb[ing] in any way or in any place the students or
teachers of any school”33—which consistently ranks among the top
two or three most frequent family-court referrals;34 76 percent of
all children referred to South Carolina family court between 2006
and 2009 (the most recent years for which public data are available) were black.35 Other research has demonstrated that these
stark disparities cannot be explained by different school behaviors by different groups,36 nor can disparities throughout the system be explained by different patterns of offending by children of
different races.37 Although racial disparities are nothing new,
some evidence suggests they have grown larger as prosecutors
have diverted a smaller proportion of cases. Between 1980 and
2000—during which prosecution became more common than diversion—the likelihood of facing an arrest and charge rose by a
particularly large amount for black boys.38

30 See generally Henning, 98 Cornell L Rev 383 (cited in note 10). National data for
arrests and court referrals often do not track Latino children separately. Racial disparities, especially in detention and waiver decisions, have been well documented for Latino
and American Indian children. See, for example, id at 409–10.
31 Children under 18 Years of Age by Race/Ethnicity (KidsCount Data Center), archived at http://perma.cc/ER39-8TM8.
32 In 2014–2015, the figure was 59 percent. South Carolina Department of Juvenile
Justice, 2015 County Datasheets, archived at http://perma.cc/VA69-FH34.
33 SC Code Ann § 16-17-420(A)–(B).
34 For instance, in 2014–2015, disturbing schools was the second most frequent
charge referred to family court, accounting for 1,222 cases. See South Carolina
Department of Juvenile Justice, 2014–2015 Annual Statistical Report *13–14 (2015), archived at http://perma.cc/BA8Q-MBGK.
35 South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice, Disturbing Schools Data: FY
2008–2009,
online
at
http://www.state.sc.us/djj/2010%20disturbing%20schools
%20presentation_files/frame.htm (visited Dec 15, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable)
(Slide 3).
36 See Redfield and Nance, School-to-Prison Pipeline Preliminary Report at *15, 20–
21 (cited in note 29).
37 See Henning, 98 Cornell L Rev at 411–15 (cited in note 10).
38 See Tia Stevens and Merry Morash, Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Boys’ Probability
of Arrest and Court Actions in 1980 and 2000: The Disproportionate Impact of “Getting
Tough” on Crime, 13 Youth Violence & Juv Just 77, 88 (2015).
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The decision about how to handle those referrals—dismiss,
divert, or prosecute—could provide an important mechanism for
reducing disparities within the juvenile justice system. However,
this decision increases racial disparities—black children are 0.7
times as likely to have their cases diverted as white children.39
The US Department of Justice (DOJ) has investigated several jurisdictions for a pattern and practice of racial discrimination and
found that, even controlling for variables like the specific charges
and criminal history, authorities were significantly more likely to
prosecute black children than white children.40 And the DOJ has
made the expansion of diversion programs41 and the assessment
and remedy of racial disparities in the decision to divert or prosecute into essential pieces of proposed remedies for such discrimination.42 Short of federal investigations, however, academic commentators have bemoaned how race-neutral procedural rights
provided to juvenile defendants “imposed no real check on the discriminatory exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”43
2. Child protection intake decisions.
Child protection cases similarly feature important discretion
at their early stages. Such cases typically begin with a report to a
child protection agency alleging that a parent or caregiver has
abused or neglected a child. Child protection agencies investigate
allegations of abuse or neglect, but an agency determination that

39 Redfield and Nance, School-to-Prison Pipeline Preliminary Report at *43 (cited in
note 29). See also Donna M. Bishop and Michael J. Leiber, Racial and Ethnic Differences
in Delinquency and Justice System Reponses, in Bishop and Feld, eds, The Oxford
Handbook of Juvenile Crime and Juvenile Justice 445, 447–51 (cited in note 18) (noting
that 62 percent of black youth referred to family court are prosecuted, compared with 58
percent of nonblack youth and 53 percent of white youth). The size of that disparity decreased slightly between 1990 and 2010. National Center for Juvenile Justice, Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2014
National Report *178 (Dec 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/XA3T-U372.
40 See Investigation of the St. Louis County Family Court at *43 (cited in note 19)
(finding in St. Louis County that “formal case handling [prosecution] occurs almost oneand-a-half times more often for Black youth, after introducing the control variables”). See
also US Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the Shelby County
Juvenile Court *32–35 (2012), archived at http://perma.cc/3YX2-2KJD (finding that in
Shelby County, Tennessee, which contains Memphis, “the odds of Black children receiving
a warning was one third less than the odds of White child[ren] receiving a warning even
after accounting for other variables”).
41 See Investigation of the Shelby County Juvenile Court at *63–64 (cited in note 40).
42 See Investigation of the St. Louis County Family Court at *55–56 (cited in note 19).
43 Sara Sun Beale, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Two Waves of Juvenile Justice
Reforms as Seen from Jena, Louisiana, 44 Harv CR–CL L Rev 511, 515 (2009).
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maltreatment occurred only begins the analysis. Agencies can
then file a case, work with families without initiating court action,44 or do nothing at all.45 The second option is akin to diversion
in delinquency cases—officials work with a family on a technically voluntary basis, but with the threat (implied or otherwise)
of filing court action if the family does not cooperate.
This type of child protection diversion happens in a large majority of cases. In fiscal year 2014, state child protection agencies
deemed 702,208 children to be abuse and neglect victims.46 But
only 26 percent of children deemed victims by state child protection agencies were the subject of court action, and only 23 percent
of children deemed victims were placed in foster care.47 States provided services to 63.7 percent of children deemed victims, essentially diverting those families, and did nothing with the remainder.48 As with juvenile delinquency, significant racial
disparities exist; state child protection agencies deemed 15.3
out of every 1,000 black children to be abused or maltreated,
compared to rates of 8.8 for Hispanic, 8.4 for white, and 1.7 for
Asian children.49
Expanding such diversion decisions has been a hallmark of
child protection reforms in the twenty-first century, with the intention of reducing the number of children removed from families
and placed in state custody. New York City’s experience is illustrative. From 2002 to 2013, New York City cut its foster care population by about half,50 a drop driven significantly by a decrease

44 This observation is simplified. Working with a family without initiating a court
case can include referring the family for some kind of service, more intensive supervision
by a child protection agency, or even requesting—with an implied threat of court action if
the parent refuses—that the parent agrees to a “safety plan,” which can include changing
the child’s physical custody.
45 An agency may do nothing if the risk of future maltreatment is removed. If, for
instance, one adult abuses a child and a parent obtains a restraining order against that
adult, no further agency action is necessary to protect the child from future abuse.
46 US Department of Health and Human Services, Children’s Bureau, Child
Maltreatment 2014 *21 (2016), archived at http://perma.cc/Q6D4-9BPE.
47 Id at *84–85.
48 Id at *80, 83.
49 Id at *41. For a summary of recent racial disproportionality data and debates in
child protection law, see generally Tanya Asim Cooper, Racial Bias in American Foster
Care: The National Debate, 97 Marq L Rev 215 (2013).
50 See Allon Yaroni, et al, Innovations in NYC Health and Human Services Policy:
Child Welfare Policy *1 (Vera Institute of Justice 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/VCW7-RTV8.
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in new placements in foster care.51 That drop roughly coincided
with a 25 percent increase in the number of children receiving
“preventive services” in their homes from 2000 to 2010.52 A less
dramatic, but similar, trend has occurred nationally, with removals of children from their families and placement into foster care
dropping approximately 13 percent from 2005 to 2014,53 although
removals have increased slightly in recent years,54 perhaps in response to the opioid epidemic.55
As the difference between New York City’s experience and
the national average suggests, national statistics mask tremendous state-by-state variation in the results of child protection
prosecutorial discretion. The percentage of child victims to whom
jurisdictions provide services ranges from 23.3 to 100 percent.56
The percentage for whom court cases are filed ranges from the
single digits to nearly two-thirds.57 Plainly, diversion is a prominent feature in most, if not all, state child protection systems, but
states differ significantly in how they determine which cases to
divert and which to prosecute.

51 New foster care placements in New York City dropped from 6,560 in 2003 to 4,179
in 2013. Compare Foster Care Placements: Number; 2003 (Citizens’ Committee for Children),
archived at http://perma.cc/N49Z-EWNA, with Foster Care Placements, Number; 2013
(Citizens’ Committee for Children), archived at http://perma.cc/HX6X-XEUP.
52 Yaroni, et al, Innovations in NYC Health and Human Services Policy at *4 (cited
in note 50).
53 US Department of Health and Human Services, Children’s Bureau, Trends in Foster Care and Adoption: FY 2005–FY 2014 *1–2 (July 9, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/GTT4-W39C.
54 Annual removals hit a low of 251,354 in fiscal year 2012, and have increased to
269,509 in FY 2015. See US Department of Health and Human Services, Children’s
Bureau, The AFCARS Report: Preliminary FY 2015 Estimates as of June 2016 *1 (June
30, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/M6PC-2B4H. The most recent removal numbers remain below those of the early 2000s; for instance, 307,000 children were removed into
foster care in 2005. See Trends in Foster Care and Adoption, FY 2005–FY 2014 at *1 (cited
in note 53).
55 See Teresa Wiltz, Drug-Addiction Epidemic Creates Crisis in Foster Care (Pew
Charitable Trusts, Oct 7, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/F72P-BG2M.
56 See Child Maltreatment 2014 at *83 (cited in note 46) (reporting that in the
District of Columbia, 23.3 percent of victims received postresponse services in 2014, while
100 percent of victims in Tennessee received postresponse services).
57 See id at *85 (reflecting that court action was initiated in 2014 in Maine for
2.9 percent of victims while 64.6 percent of Montana victims had a corresponding
court action).
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Criminal Prosecutors’ Power

Academics widely view criminal prosecutors’ power as an essential point of study for understanding the criminal justice system, focusing especially on prosecutors’ charging discretion. Prosecutors are the “Leviathan” in our criminal justice system—
effectively investigating individuals and determining their guilt
and punishment by exercising their charging discretion and leveraging guilty pleas through the threat of harsh sentences for defendants who do not so plead.58 Criminal prosecutors’ power is “a
glaring and dangerous exception” to normal separation-of-powers
principles because they largely exercise this power without significant checks from other branches of government.59 As a result,
prosecutors’ power is viewed as a contributing factor, if not a
prime cause, of mass incarceration.60 Relatedly, prosecutors’
power is viewed as “a major cause of racial inequality in the criminal justice system,” and reforming how prosecutors use that
power may be an important tool to addressing those inequalities.61
Much less focus has been placed on family-court prosecutors.
The role of juvenile delinquency prosecutors has gained some attention in studies evaluating which cases ought to be prosecuted
at all62 and, among those cases, which ought to be waived63 for
criminal prosecution as adults. But the role, structure, and checks
and balances on family-court prosecutors have largely escaped academic attention in both delinquency and child protection cases.
In particular, there has not been significant exploration of how
58 See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 Stan L Rev 869, 874–87 (2009). Professor Rachel E.
Barkow also aptly summarizes generations of critiques of prosecutorial power and the absence of checks on it. See, for example, id at 874 n 16 (collecting sources critiquing the
“expansion of federal criminal law”). See also John F. Pfaff, Locked In: The True Causes of
Mass Incarceration—and How to Achieve Real Reform 127 (Basic Books 2017) (“Few people in the criminal justice system are as powerful, or as central to prison growth, as the
prosecutor.”); Angela J. Davis, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor 8
n 16 (Oxford 2007) (collecting sources critiquing prosecutorial power).
59 Barkow, 61 Stan L Rev at 871 (cited in note 58).
60 Pfaff, Locked In at 127–59 (cited in note 58).
61 See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion,
67 Fordham L Rev 13, 17–19, 50–53 (1998).
62 See generally, for example, Henning, 98 Cornell L Rev 383 (cited in note 10);
Cynthia Godsoe, Recasting Vagueness: The Case of Teen Sex Statutes, 74 Wash & Lee L
Rev 173 (2017); Mary Willis, Utilizing Prosecutorial Discretion to Reduce the Number of
Juveniles with Disabilities in the Juvenile Justice System, 2016 BYU Educ & L J 191.
63 See generally, for example, Donna M. Bishop and Charles E. Frazier, Transfer of
Juveniles to Criminal Court: A Case Study and Analysis of Prosecutorial Waiver, 5 Notre
Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol 281 (1991).
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delinquency or child protection prosecutors determine which
cases to file and which to divert or dismiss, whether their power
should be checked, and if so, how.
This Article thus fills a critical gap in the literature. Placing
juvenile delinquency and child protection prosecutorial authority
in elected prosecutors’ offices has not been thoroughly examined
or challenged. Nor has the role of administrative agencies in exercising family-court prosecutorial discretion been scrutinized.
This gap is particularly striking in light of literature bemoaning the absence of sufficient checks on criminal prosecutors’ authority and articulating how administrative-law principles might
play a helpful role. Professor Rachel Barkow has argued that
some administrative-law principles regarding the internal structure of government offices can help check prosecutorial power.64
Even that suggestion is premised on the conclusion that courts
and policymakers will not impose meaningful external checks on
prosecutorial power.65 This Article argues that this pessimistic
conclusion need not apply to family-court prosecutors if the law
recognizes the essential role of agencies and empowers judges to
review agency balancing of the competing goals of our juvenile
justice and child protection system.66
C.

Agency Counsel versus Centralized Prosecutorial Control

Administrative agencies’ central role in both the juvenile justice and child protection systems makes another body of literature
important—scholarship exploring the role of executive-branch
lawyers in exercising prosecutorial discretion in a wide range of
civil and criminal areas of law. Most of this literature has focused
on the federal government, addressing the DOJ’s widespread
(though not universal) control over federal agency litigation and
analyzing the role of both agency and DOJ attorneys.67 Scholars

64

See Barkow, 61 Stan L Rev at 887–906 (cited in note 58).
See id at 908 (“[Judicial oversight] is too costly, too inefficient, and not sufficiently
deferential to what are perceived to be experts in the field.”). Professor Angela J. Davis
has worked from a similar premise, proposing the collection and publication of detailed
data on prosecutors’ decisions by race of defendants and crime victims as a means to “help
prosecutors make informed decisions about the formulation of policies and establish standards to guide the exercise of discretion in specific cases.” See Davis, 67 Fordham L Rev at
19 (cited in note 61).
66 See Part IV.C.
67 See generally, for example, Neal Devins and Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for
Department of Justice Control of Federal Litigation, 5 U Pa J Const L 558 (2002); David
Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 Yale L J 616 (2013).
65
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have noted that “we seem hardly to have considered” questions of
how to hold government agencies accountable in determining
when and how to use their enforcement authority.68 Some recent
literature has explored these themes at the state level, exploring
the role of state attorneys general in high-profile cases,69 and of
state agency general counsels.70
Both sets of literature note that most agency lawyers do not
litigate on behalf of their agency clients—especially because the
litigation role is taken by lawyers from DOJ or a state attorney
general’s office—but that, nonetheless, many carveouts for
agency litigation authority exist in both state and federal governments.71 And, relatedly, some scholarship has criticized grants of
litigation authority to the DOJ and argued for shifting that authority to agencies.72
I am aware of no study that has connected these themes to
state family-court litigation—even though the litigation carveouts for some states’ child protection agencies account for thousands of cases annually. Moreover, no study has connected these
themes to the role of local prosecutors in juvenile cases.73

68 Margaret H. Lemos, Accountability and Independence in Public Enforcement *3
(Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No 2016-23, Mar 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/8X88-JLFG.
69 See generally, for example, Neal Devins and Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Fifty
States, Fifty Attorneys General, and Fifty Approaches to the Duty to Defend, 124 Yale L J
2100 (2015); Margaret H. Lemos and Kevin M. Quinn, Litigating State Interests: Attorneys
General as Amici, 90 NYU L Rev 1229 (2015); Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation
Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 Harv L Rev 486 (2012).
70 See generally, for example, Elizabeth Chambliss and Dana Remus, Nothing Could
Be Finer?: The Role of Agency General Counsel in North and South Carolina, 84 Fordham
L Rev 2039 (2016).
71 See id at 2049 (“[S]pecialized carve-outs grant some agencies and commissions authority to litigate some types of matters on their own behalf.”); Devins and Herz, 5 U Pa J
Const L at 561 (cited in note 67) (noting “approximately three-dozen” federal agency litigation carveouts that have “significantly eroded” DOJ’s control over federal litigation);
Neal Devins, Toward an Understanding of Legal Policy-Making at Independent Agencies,
in Cornell W. Clayton, ed, Government Lawyers: The Federal Legal Bureaucracy and
Presidential Politics 181, 184–89 (Kansas 1995) (providing a primer on federal agency litigation control).
72 See, for example, Devins and Herz, 5 U Pa J Const L at 570–94 (cited in note 67).
73 Some studies have discussed the importance of DOJ control over federal criminal
prosecutions. See id at 561–62. The grounds for this centralized DOJ control differ significantly when applied to state juvenile delinquency prosecutions. See text accompanying
notes 398–403.
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II. HISTORY OF FAMILY-COURT PROSECUTORS: IGNORED AT THE
ORIGINS, REQUIRED BY POST-GAULT REFORMS
At its origins, all functions of the family court—including
charging discretion in both delinquency and child protection
cases—rested in the court itself. The present role of family-court
prosecutors evolved following the family court’s “constitutional
domestication” that the Supreme Court required in Gault.74 Those
reforms shifted charging decisions away from the family court,
but did so without a cohesive or consistent structure for the entities that took over this authority. In juvenile delinquency cases,
elected prosecutors took on this essential authority without much
critical consideration of whether they were best suited for the job
or how their power should interact with intake officers. In child
protection cases, jurisdictions split over whether state agencies or
elected prosecutors should have this essential power, also without
much critical consideration. In neither field did reforms lead to a
consistent set of structures or, more importantly, to structures
justified by delinquency and child protection law’s rehabilitative
mission.
This Part traces the evolution of the modern family-court
prosecutor in both child protection and juvenile delinquency
cases, which involved shifts along four planes. First, the family
court evolved from a relatively lawyerless system at its origins to
one with lawyers representing both the state and individuals.
Second, charging authority largely shifted away from court staff
and to executive-branch officials. Here, child protection cases and
delinquency cases followed different paths—child protection
agencies obtained a relatively greater degree of control over intake decisions, while prosecutors, without agency clients, became
the dominant players in delinquency cases. Neither field developed consistent structures across jurisdictions, and problematic
vestiges of the original structure remain, as Part III.C documents. Third, the growth of the administrative state shaped prosecutorial discretion. Comprehensive child protection agencies became common by the 1970s, and these agencies became obvious
candidates in which prosecutorial authority ought to reside. The
juvenile justice administrative state was more varied; in some
states, juvenile justice agencies were involved from the beginnings to the ends of cases and thus had a role in charging decisions (even if it was secondary to the role of prosecutors). In other
74

Gault, 387 US at 22.
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states, juvenile justice agencies’ roles were limited to supervising
children only after they were found guilty, with intake staff (often
employed by courts) continuing to play a role at the beginning of
cases.
The fourth, and perhaps most dramatic, shift is the evolution
of prosecutors—at least in delinquency cases—into a tool of
tough-on-crime reforms. Intake decisions were historically
viewed as essential elements of family courts’ rehabilitative purpose, with “judicious nonintervention” a hallmark of the system.75
The system historically avoided prosecutors for fear they would
apply a more punitive purpose, and even in the years following
Gault, leading commentators saw prosecutors as inheritors of
family courts’ rehabilitative goals. Delinquency prosecutors’ role
shifted, however, in the 1980s and 1990s, as they used their relatively new intake authority to increase the proportion of cases
prosecuted.
A.

Pre-Gault Procedure

The problematic structure of the early family court frames
the development of family-court prosecutors through the present.
Intake decisions were essential to family courts from an early
point in their history. Family courts, however, were wary of
elected prosecutors as unlikely to follow the court’s rehabilitative
purpose, so court staff would decide what cases to prosecute and
prosecute them. In avoiding prosecutors (and many other due process protections, including lawyers for children or parents), this
system created a range of constitutional problems.
1. No prosecutors and not much due process.
From family courts’ origin at the turn of the twentieth century to the Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Gault, family courts
had developed a unique system for making charging decisions in
both child protection and juvenile delinquency cases, which
placed court staff in decisive roles and excluded prosecutors and
other executive-branch officials.
The very early family court permitted private citizens to file
petitions alleging that a child was neglected or delinquent, and
held hearings regarding any child who was the subject of any
citizen’s complaint. The first juvenile-court statute—enacted by

75

See text accompanying note 86.
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Illinois in 1899—provided that “[a]ny reputable person, . . . having knowledge of a child in his county who appears to be either
neglected, dependent or delinquent, may file . . . a petition,” which
would automatically trigger a summons and a hearing.76 The statute contained neither references to any role for prosecutors nor
any procedure to screen out petitions that did not warrant prosecution. Publications from the 1920s—after nearly every state had
established some kind of juvenile court—illustrate similar procedures around the country.77 There was no role for any executivebranch entity until cases reached disposition, when the juvenile
court could, as in Illinois, send neglected children to “some suitable State institution” or delinquent children to “training schools”
or “industrial schools” (these various institutions would be subject
to some state oversight).78
Early family-court leaders were clear that prosecutors ought
not have a role because that would threaten the court’s rehabilitative purpose. Assigning to district attorneys the responsibility
of filing petitions, “of course, savors too much of a prosecution and
is practised as an expedient only in small or rural communities”
without family-court staff.79 The federal Children’s Bureau opined
that referring cases to local district attorneys’ offices was “[c]ontrary to generally approved practice in juvenile-court work.”80 The
best procedure, it was thought, was for members of the community, such as parents, to file juvenile charges.81 In practice, the
source of court complaints varied—with police complaints dominating in some cities, and parent, school, or other referrals being
a larger force in others.82

76 Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899 §§ 4–5, reprinted in 49 Juv & Fam Ct J 1, 2
(Fall 1998). Notably, cases involving children who were allegedly “neglected, dependent
[and] delinquent” were addressed in the same statute.
77 See, for example, Herbert H. Lou, 5 Juvenile Courts in the United States 99 (North
Carolina 1927).
78 See Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899 §§ 7, 9, 13, reprinted in 49 Juv & Fam Ct J
at 2–4 (cited in note 76).
79 Lou, 5 Juvenile Courts in the United States at 100 (cited in note 77). A study of ten
urban court systems found only one with any prosecutorial involvement. See Katharine F.
Lenroot and Emma O. Lundberg, Juvenile Courts at Work: A Study of the Organization
and Methods of Ten Courts 39–51 (Government Printing Office 1925) (reporting that, in
Los Angeles, “[c]ontrary to generally approved practice in juvenile-court work, those cases
in which the juvenile bureau deemed court action necessary were reported by that bureau
not to the juvenile court but to the office of the district attorney”).
80 Lenroot and Lundberg, Juvenile Courts at Work at 47 (cited in note 79).
81 See id at 51.
82 See id at 40.
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Relatively quickly, the number of complaints required courtemployed probation or intake officers to determine which to prosecute and which to divert or dismiss. The 1899 Illinois statute
charged the court with appointing juvenile probation officers who
would investigate cases, “represent the interests of the child,” and
otherwise “furnish to the court such information and assistance
as the judge may require.”83 Faced with growing delinquency
dockets and recognizing that not all children subject to private
individuals’ petitions needed court intervention, by the 1920s,
court staff began deciding which cases could be dismissed and
which prosecuted.84
Frequent use of diversion was essential. Authorities recommended that family-court probation officers not pursue formal
charges and instead seek diversion—then called informal adjustment—“whenever feasible.”85 As a later federal commission wrote,
hearing delinquency cases in a separate court from criminal cases
depended on a more rehabilitative emphasis at intake: “If there
is a defensible philosophy for the juvenile court it is one of judicious nonintervention.”86 Juvenile probation or intake officers
soon exercised that authority around the country, investigating
complaints that a child was delinquent or neglected and determining if they would file a petition.87 Actual practices varied substantially—both in the number of cases informally adjusted and
in the procedures used for such adjustments.88
These changes left the family-court probation officers operating as a “quasi-social welfare agency” decades before the modern

83 Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899 § 6, reprinted in 49 Juv & Fam Ct J at 2 (cited
in note 76).
84 See H. Ted Rubin, The Emerging Prosecutor Dominance of the Juvenile Court
Intake Process, 26 Crime & Delinq 299, 301 (1980). See also Lou, Juvenile Courts in the
United States at 223 (cited in note 77). Lou reported on the Juvenile Court Standards
adopted in 1923 by a committee appointed by the US Children’s Bureau. Id at 221.
85 Lou, Juvenile Courts in the United States at 224 (cited in note 77). Legislative
reforms calling for “informal adjustments” noted their “great[ ] significance” to improved
intake decisions. Noah Weinstein, The Juvenile Court Concept in Missouri: Its Historical
Development—the Need for New Legislation, 1957 Wash U L Q 17, 38.
86 Edwin M. Lemert, The Juvenile Court—Quest and Realities, in President’s
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report:
Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 91, 96 (Government Printing Office 1967).
87 See The Administration of Juvenile Justice—the Juvenile Court and Related
Methods of Delinquency Control, in Task Force Report 1, 5 (cited in note 86).
88 See Lenroot and Lundberg, Juvenile Courts at Work at 109–14 (cited in note 79). In
some cities, court staff declined to file formal charges in three-quarters of complaints, while
in others court staff informally adjusted only around two-fifths of complaints. Id at 111.
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administrative state developed.89 Court staff would identify individuals and families who they believed would benefit from the
court’s services and provide them—either by court order, if they
prosecuted a case, or without one, if they diverted it. The procedure in child protection cases was contemporaneously described
in agency terms: “The probation department is an agency of the
court. It is thus the court’s agent who works with the family after
the initial complaint. Most often, it is the court’s agent who files
the neglect petition.”90
Similarly, family-court leaders believed that emphasizing diversion in delinquency cases required keeping elected prosecutors
away from family court. Family-court observers explicitly distinguished court-staff control from elected-prosecutor control in the
criminal system.91 Excluding prosecutors from charging decisions
remained essential to ensure charging authority rested with
these officials who would promote rehabilitative goals.92
The unique nature and importance of this rehabilitationfocused intake structure filtered up to the Supreme Court’s later
decisions about juvenile law. Justice Byron White noted it as one
ground for denying children the right to a jury trial in McKeiver
v Pennsylvania.93 In adult cases, juries serve as “a buffer to the
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor.”94 But “the distinctive intake

89 Douglas E. Abrams, A Very Special Place in Life: The History of Juvenile Justice
in Missouri 138 (Missouri Juvenile Justice Association 2003). See also Leslie J. Harris,
Rethinking the Relationship between Juvenile Courts and Treatment Agencies—an
Administrative Law Approach, 28 J Fam L 217, 257–58 (1989).
90 Patrick T. Murphy, NLADA Juvenile Court Project, 27 Legal Aid Briefcase 224,
225–26 (1969).
91 See Margaret K. Rosenheim and Daniel L. Skoler, The Lawyer’s Role at Intake and
Detention Stages of Juvenile Court Proceedings, 11 Crime & Delinq 167, 168–69 (1965)
(“[I]ntake in the juvenile court is, for the most part, conducted by social work staff as opposed to the participation of lawyers or judicial officers in criminal cases.”). See also The
Administration of Juvenile Justice at 15 (cited in note 87) (explaining that “[n]either defense attorney nor prosecutor regularly appears” in any intake meeting or hearing, and
that during “the juvenile court intake process there is nothing comparable to the key role
played by the prosecutor in criminal cases during bargaining for dismissal or lesser
charges”).
92 For instance, 1957 Missouri legislation prevented prosecutors from initiating
charges to keep a “vestige of criminal procedure” out of family court. Weinstein, 1957 Wash
U L Q at 38 (cited in note 85).
93 403 US 528 (1971). The Supreme Court decided McKeiver four years after Gault,
but the role of prosecutors had not yet evolved fully and White appears to have had a
traditional family-court intake officer role in mind.
94 Id at 552 (White concurring).
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policies and procedures of the juvenile court system to a great extent obviate this important function of the jury.”95
2. Structural problems.
However insightful the insistence on separating criminal
prosecutors may have been from a rehabilitative process, the
early family-court intake structure had severe separation-ofpowers and due process problems. The officials determining
which cases to prosecute were judicial-branch staff answerable to
the family-court judges who would rule on their petitions.96 In the
years preceding Gault, various authorities criticized this structure, arguing that a “court through the use of its own staff should
not be placed in the position of investigator and petitioner and
also act as the tribunal deciding the validity of the allegations in
the petition.”97 Compounding these problems, the same judicialbranch officials who “made investigations and filed petitions”
would attempt to “represent[ ] children and their interests in
court,”98 thus depriving children and parents of advocates who
would subject petitions against them to adversarial testing.

95 Id (White concurring). See also In re Winship, 397 US 358, 366–67 (1970) (noting
“procedures distinctive to juvenile proceedings that are employed prior to the adjudicatory
hearing”). A split Court decided McKeiver, and White’s opinion, not the plurality’s, was
decisive. Core features relied on by White—including the prosecutorial dominance of
intake—have changed, but the Supreme Court has not revisited McKeiver. State supreme
courts have considered more recent arguments that children should have a jury trial right,
but they have largely followed McKeiver. See, for example, In re Stephen W., 761 SE2d
231, 232 (SC 2014). But see In re L.M., 186 P3d 164, 170–71 (Kan 2008) (finding a state
constitutional right to a juvenile jury trial but recognizing that most states have ruled
otherwise).
96 See Rubin, 26 Crime & Delinq at 299 (cited in note 84) (“The values of the juvenile
court judge, often the employer of probation personnel, have influenced these [charging]
decisions.”).
97 Sheridan, Standards for Juvenile and Family Courts at 13 (cited in note 14). One
court tried to justify this structure by arguing that “the juvenile court merely supervises
the operation of court employees,” and those employees make decisions about whether to
file charges in individual cases. In re Appeal in Pima County Anonymous, Juvenile Action,
515 P2d 600, 604 (Ariz 1973). This distinction between “mere supervision” and individual
case decisionmaking is weak, as supervision generally shaped how court staff make those
individual decisions. See Matter of Reis, 7 Crim L Rptr (BNA) 2151, 2152 (RI Fam 1970);
The Administration of Juvenile Justice at 9 n 31 (cited in note 87) (“[M]any discretionary
judgments are made by court staff within explicit guidelines evolved by or with the juvenile court judge.”).
98 In the Matter of the Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action, 594 P2d 506, 508
(Ariz 1979).
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The Supreme Court’s watershed decision in Gault denounced
the absence of due process in family-court trials and required dramatic reforms—“constitutional domestication.”99 Following a
neighbor’s complaint about an alleged sexual prank call, a deputy
probation officer filed a petition alleging that Gerald Gault was
delinquent, but not alleging any specific facts.100 The probation
officer then prosecuted Gault in Gila County, Arizona, family
court, with no prosecutor present.101 Gault was not given notice of
the specific charges against him, had no opportunity to confront
or question the witness against him, was denied the ability to stay
quiet in the face of government questioning, and was denied a
lawyer to help him fight the charges against him.102 The Supreme
Court famously decried these procedures, writing that “the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.”103 The Court
held that the Constitution provided basic due process protections
to children alleged to be delinquents—the right to notice, to confront witnesses, protection against self-incrimination, and, essentially, counsel.104
The prosecutorial discretion exercised in Gault illustrates
that the family-court structure provided children with “the worst
of both worlds: . . . neither the protections accorded to adults nor
the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.”105 That “solicitous care” would seem to suggest that an individual exercising prosecutorial discretion would dismiss or divert a case about a lewd prank phone call. Instead, the probation
officer charged Gault, and the court committed him to the state
industrial school.106
Reflecting the family court’s historical linkage of delinquency
and child protection jurisdiction, some of Gault’s dicta suggested
that analogous due process concerns applied to child protection
cases. The Court suggested concern both for Gault’s loss of
physical liberty and for his separation from his parents—the core

99

Gault, 387 US at 22.
Id at 4–5.
101 See id at 5–6.
102 See id at 5–10. The charges were ripe for a challenge. Gault was charged with
making a lewd telephone call to his neighbor, but the record was not clear whether Gault
or a friend made any of the allegedly lewd statements. See id at 5–7.
103 Gault, 387 US at 28.
104 See id at 31–57.
105 Id at 18 n 23, quoting Kent v United States, 383 US 541, 556 (1966).
106 See Gault, 387 US at 4–5.
100
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constitutional right at issue in child protection cases.107 When discussing the specific importance of notice, the Court stated that
the Due Process Clause “does not allow a hearing to be held in
which a youth’s freedom and his parents’ right to his custody are
at stake” without adequate notice of the state’s specific allegations.108 The absence of a clearer ruling on parental rights may
have resulted from a litigation choice; Gault had argued to the
Arizona courts that the juvenile court should not have “remove[d]
Gerald from the custody of his parents without a showing and
finding of their unsuitability,”109 but Gault’s lawyer did not raise
this argument to the Supreme Court.110 Thus, Gault reflected the
need for a family-court system that provided basic due process
rights both to children in delinquency cases and, implicitly, to
families in child protection cases, and Gault soon became a key
impetus for reform of family-court procedures in both fields.
B.

Post-Gault Pressure to Reform

Although Gault’s specific holdings addressed neither juvenile
court intake111 nor child protection cases, its “constitutional domestication”112 of the juvenile court nonetheless catalyzed reforms
in both fields. Part II.B.1 discusses reform efforts in juvenile delinquency law, while Part II.B.2 details legal developments in
child protection law.
1. Pressures for reform in juvenile delinquency law.
Gault indirectly113 caused reforms to family-court intake procedure. Gault suggested that basic constitutional protections
would apply to family court, making the separation-of-powers
107 See id at 10 (noting Gault’s argument that he should not be removed from his
parents without proof of their “unsuitability” and that he was “taken from the custody
of his parents” unconstitutionally); id at 17 (describing family courts’ delinquency jurisdiction as being triggered by “parent[al] default in effectively performing their custodial
functions”).
108 Id at 33–34.
109 Id at 10.
110 See Martin Guggenheim, Barry Feld: An Intellectual History of a Juvenile Court
Reformer, 17 Nev L J 371, 375 (2017).
111 Gault, 387 US at 13.
112 Id at 22.
113 The Court did not explicitly address “the procedures or constitutional rights applicable to the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process.” Id at 13. The Court recognized that
such procedures were “unique to the juvenile process” and disclaimed any intent to change
or even address them, thus enabling the Court to rebut criticism that Gault jeopardized
what was different about family court. Id at 31 n 48.
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problems in its intake structure hard to ignore. More practically,
Gault’s requirement that states provide defense counsel for children in delinquency cases114 resulted in an unsustainable situation. Court intake officers would now face defense attorneys without having attorneys themselves—putting them “at a severe
disadvantage.”115 When probation officers could engage effectively
in an adversarial trial, their efforts would damage their efforts to
build a relationship with the child and family necessary to providing rehabilitative services in the event of a conviction.116
This uneven playing field pressured family-court judges to intervene. Many appeared to take on the role of a prosecutor, including examining both prosecution and defense witnesses.117
Such events created obvious problems of judicial bias, contrary to
the constitutional domestication that Gault directed.118 Judges
confronted this problem,119 and complained about it. One prominent New York City family-court judge, Justine Wise Polier, described it this way:
As a result of this situation, the Court is all too often required
to question the complaining witnesses. . . . Such a procedure
. . . places the Court in the untenable position of having to
seek the facts on which a petition of delinquency is based,
hear the defense, and then undertake to evaluate and pass
on the evidence as a Judge.120
The problem, Polier concluded, “calls for corrective legislation.”121

114

See id at 34–42.
Douglas J. Besharov, Juvenile Justice Advocacy: Practice in a Unique Court 39
(Practising Law Institute 1974).
116 See Edwin M. Lemert, Legislating Change in the Juvenile Court, 1967 Wis L Rev
421, 434.
117 See id.
118 See Gault, 387 US at 40–41. See also M. Marvin Finkelstein, et al, Prosecution in
the Juvenile Courts: Guidelines for the Future 10 (DOJ 1973) (“[T]he assumption of prosecutorial roles by the probation staff or the juvenile court judge creates undesirable role
conflicts.”).
119 See, for example, Lemert, 1967 Wis L Rev at 436 (cited in note 116) (quoting one
judge who acknowledged the problematic role of helping to prosecute a child).
120 Matter of Lang, 255 NYS2d 987, 992 (Fam 1965). Polier addressed the situation
created by New York’s pre-Gault statutory provision of counsel to juvenile defendants—a
situation that Gault created nationally. See Note, The Juvenile Offender’s Procedural
Rights in the New York Family Court, 41 St John’s L Rev 386, 392 (1967) (“[T]he judge
may be thrown into a prosecutor’s state of mind by the presence of an advocate for the
child, but none against him.”).
121 See Lang, 255 NYS2d at 991.
115
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Judicial calls for reform were insufficiently granular, as they
left to legislatures the task of defining the precise structure that
new legislation should create. The challenge was illustrated in a
1971 case in which the Rhode Island Family Court ruled that
its intake structure—which had not been changed since
Gault—violated due process for many of the reasons discussed in
Part II.A.1. It held that the court “must be entirely independent
of the investigative and accusatory process.”122 The court mused
that intake authority “belongs somewhere else”—but did not define where that “somewhere else” should be or how it should accommodate the increasing role both of lawyers for all parties and
for administrative agencies.123
2. Pressures for reform in child protection law.
Gault implied concern with the rights of parents to maintain
custody of their children,124 but it did not directly address child
protection cases. There is no case equivalent to Gault in the child
protection pantheon. Nonetheless, several legal developments
contemporaneously created pressure for reform to family-court
prosecutorial discretion in child protection cases. First, attorneys
for parents and some kind of advocate for children became far
more prevalent in child protection cases in the years after Gault.
The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act125 (CAPTA) required states to provide guardians ad litem for children as a condition of receiving federal funding.126 The Supreme Court noted in
1981 that “[i]nformed opinion has clearly come to hold that an
indigent parent is entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel
not only in parental termination proceedings, but in dependency
and neglect proceedings as well.”127

122

See Reis, 7 Crim L Rptr (BNA) at 2152.
See id.
124 See note 107 and accompanying text.
125 Pub L No 93-247, 88 Stat 4 (1974), codified as amended at 42 USC § 5101 et seq.
126 CAPTA § 4(b)(2)(G), 88 Stat at 7, 42 USC § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii).
127 Lassiter v Department of Social Services, 452 US 18, 33–34 (1981). By 1981,
twenty-five states provided parents with a right to counsel throughout child protection
cases, as opposed to only in termination cases. See Besharov, 6 Vt L Rev at 404–05 n 16
(cited in note 3). This progress came through statutory rather than constitutional law. The
Supreme Court established some due process baselines for child protection cases. See generally, for example, Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645 (1972); Smith v Organization of Foster
Families for Equality and Reform, 431 US 816 (1977); Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745
(1982). But, unlike in Gault, the Court did not find a constitutional right to counsel. See
Lassiter, 452 US at 31.
123
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Second, the number of child abuse and neglect reports increased eightfold between 1963 and 1980, and the number of resulting family-court cases increased as well.128 Taken together,
these trends meant that in a large and increasing number of
cases, parents would have lawyers and children would have advocates, creating similar pressures in child protection cases to
what Polier observed in delinquency cases.129
Third, the child protection administrative state grew increasingly complex in the years after Gault and presented an alternative to court staff for making intake decisions. The Social Security
Act130 had triggered the development of some state welfare agencies to administer federal welfare payments, including in some
states a foster care agency.131 These agencies (and federal and
state statutes affecting them) grew more complicated in the 1960s
and 1970s—establishing child abuse and neglect hotlines, adopting mandatory reporting statutes to require certain individuals
to report suspected abuse or neglect, and charging child protection agencies with investigating these reports.132 Congress made
such reporting and investigation regimes a requirement for states
to receive federal child welfare funding when it enacted CAPTA
in 1974.133 By that point, child protection agencies were closely
involved with child abuse and neglect cases from their earliest
stages—and thus could present a strong claim that they should
control which of those cases to prosecute.
C.

Delinquency Prosecutors Reform

After Gault, delinquency intake structures required reform,
but it was not obvious that reforms would empower elected prosecutors. If a “fundamentally fair juvenile justice proceeding might
well look very different from a fundamentally fair criminal justice
proceeding,”134 then creating a juvenile analog to adult criminal
prosecutors might not be the best solution.

128

Besharov, 6 Vt L Rev at 403 (cited in note 3).
See id at 405–06.
130 49 Stat 620 (1935), codified as amended at 42 USC § 301 et seq.
131 See, for example, Abrams, A Very Special Place in Life at 138–39 (cited in note 89)
(describing the creation of the Missouri Social Security Commission and a subagency, the
Department of Foster Care, in response to the Social Security Act).
132 See Thomas L. Hafemeister, Castles Made of Sand? Rediscovering Child Abuse
and Society’s Response, 36 Ohio N U L Rev 819, 840–42 (2010).
133 See CAPTA § 4(b)(2)(B)–(D), 88 Stat at 6.
134 Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U Chi L Rev 39, 42 (2003).
129
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This Section outlines initial post-Gault debates over this issue and explains how elected prosecutors gradually took on
greater power. In particular, this Section describes how familycourt leaders initially intended delinquency prosecutors to exercise intake authority consistent with the family court’s rehabilitative purposes, but that perspective changed in the 1980s and
1990s. By then, prosecutors were seen as tools of tough-on-crime
reforms and used their authority to prosecute a higher proportion of cases, but without establishing a consensus about intake
structures.
1. No immediate consensus.
Even before Gault, scholars and government agencies were
aware of the need for government lawyers in juvenile justice proceedings, yet there was no consensus as to who that lawyer should
be or how that lawyer should exercise prosecutorial discretion.
While Gault was pending before the Supreme Court, the
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency called for more formal and systematic intake decisions,135 and for agencies outside
of the court to play a role in those decisions. Angst about elected
prosecutors remained—“[u]sing the public prosecutor may be too
great a departure from the spirit of the juvenile court”136—but the
commission declined to identify an agency it believed ought to be
in charge of intake or which lawyers ought to represent the
state.137
Soon after Gault, two academics argued about the value of
assigning that role to regular prosecutors. Sanford Fox—a Boston
College law professor, consultant to the President’s Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, and member
of the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association’s
(ABA) Committee on the Rights of Children138—argued that
assigning that role to an office “whose overriding concern is the

135

See The Administration of Juvenile Justice at 21 (cited in note 87).
Id at 34. In a footnote, the Commission described this as a “controversial question”
and did not take a position beyond noting that the prosecutor could work for the district
attorney’s office, a city’s corporation counsel’s office, the police, or some “other” unidentified agency. Id at 15 n 81.
137 See id at 18–19.
138 Jack Dunn, Sean Smith, and Nathaniel Kenyon, Sanford Fox Recalled as
Children’s Rights Advocate (Boston College Chron, July 20, 2000), archived at
http://perma.cc/ZLN6-7BX4.
136
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vindication of the penal law by conviction and punishment of violators” would “defeat[ ] the welfare and rehabilitative functions of
juvenile court process.”139 Fox proposed the creation of a new
executive-branch agency—the Office of Community Advocates—
that would determine which cases to prosecute “based on a thoroughly investigated report concerning the social and psychological needs of the child.”140
Professor Douglas Besharov—who then taught at New York
University School of Law and went on to an influential policy and
academic career—took a competing view.141 Besharov acknowledged that “hardnosed” prosecutorial methods could undermine
the family court’s purpose,142 but offered several counterpoints.
First, proving that an individual, even (or especially) a child, has
committed a crime is “not for the faint of heart.”143 Second,
Besharov articulated a faith that, with the right training, juvenile
prosecutors could also accept and promote the juvenile justice system’s rehabilitative goals,144 and that, with experience, juvenile
prosecutors “can be helped to understand and appreciate” the
value of diverting many cases.145 Besharov was less clear about
how the training and supervision necessary to ensure this balance
would be provided, as is evident in his passive-voice construction
of his assertion.
Neither Fox nor Besharov recommended that an agency specifically charged with rehabilitating children who commit crimes
have the authority to determine which children required
139 Sanford J. Fox, Prosecutors in the Juvenile Court: A Statutory Proposal, 8 Harv J
Legis 33, 42–43 (1970).
140 Id at 41–42. See also Sheridan, Standards for Juvenile and Family Courts at 13
(cited in note 14) (suggesting shifting charging discretion from family-court staff “to the
police, to the school, or to other administrative agencies providing protective services for
children”). The DOJ recommended that Boston authorities form a juvenile prosecutors’
office that would “be distinct in personnel and organization from any other state or local
prosecution apparatus.” Finkelstein, et al, Prosecution in the Juvenile Courts at 90 (cited
in note 118). That jurisdiction did not follow the recommendation; prosecutorial authority
in Boston is now held by the Suffolk County District Attorney’s office, which has a Juvenile
Unit. See About the Office (Suffolk County District Attorney), archived at
http://perma.cc/76CM-6BNK.
141 Besharov is now a professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy.
See Douglas Besharov (UM School of Public Policy), archived at http://perma.cc/83UP
-93PR. When he published his book in 1974, Besharov taught at the NYU School of Law.
Besharov, Juvenile Justice Advocacy: Practice in a Unique Court at 558 (cited in note 115).
142 Besharov, Juvenile Justice Advocacy: Practice in a Unique Court at 43–44 (cited
in note 115).
143 Id at 44.
144 Id at 44–45.
145 Id.
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prosecution—a stark contrast to contemporaneous developments
in child protection law. The notion of a juvenile justice agency
that determined which cases to divert and prosecute, operated diversion programs, supervised children on probation postadjudication, and provided services to children committed to its custody
was thus not explored.
Many reform efforts recognized that executive-branch prosecuting attorneys were necessary, but failed to consider in much
depth who those attorneys ought to be, thus skirting over Fox and
Besharov’s debate. An illustrative book published the year after
Gault recognized that the new requirement of defense counsel
would necessitate counsel for the state and that probation or intake officers should no longer prosecute cases.146 But it listed options for who that prosecuting attorney might be—someone from
the local prosecutor’s office or “special counsel to the police department or attorney for the court-related services”—without further discussion of which option might be best or how these new
family-court prosecutors would interact with (or supplant) existing intake decisionmakers.147 The ABA adopted standards for
family-court organization in 1980 and made clear that an
executive-branch agency should make charging decisions,148 but
said nothing about which agency or attorneys should be involved
in those decisions.149
2. A gradual shift to elected prosecutors’ control and
prosecutors as a tool of tough-on-crime reforms.
Eventually, prosecutors exerted power at the intake stage,
with varying roles for intake officers.150 By 1979, the ABA observed that charging decisions were “increasingly vested through

146 B. James George Jr, Gault and the Juvenile Court Revolution 52 (Institute of
Continuing Legal Education 1968).
147 Id at 52–53. See also id at 73–74 (noting two state statutes calling for attorneys
general, district attorneys, or county prosecutors to represent the state in delinquency
cases).
148 IJA-ABA Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards, Standards Relating to
Court Organization and Administration 5–6, 15 (Ballinger 1980).
149 See id at 15–18.
150 See Mears, The Front End of Juvenile Court at 576 (cited in note 18); Joseph B.
Tulman, The Role of the Probation Officer in Intake: Stories from before, during, and after
the Delinquency Initial Hearing, 3 DC L Rev 235, 244 (1995) (describing 1970 statutory
change in DC law).
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statute in the office of the prosecutor.”151 But prosecutors appeared through a variety of mechanisms—many state statutes
were silent on the question and others were involved only through
a family-court order.152 Some systems even hung on to the old,
prosecutor-less, court-intake-staff-driven procedure.153 But by a
decade after Gault, the pressure imposed by that case had resulted in significant changes. As the Arizona Supreme Court explained in that year, Gault had found that state’s juvenile procedures unconstitutional, and recent legislation “recognized that
the adversary system had been introduced [by Gault].”154 The
Arizona legislature eventually responded by both codifying juveniles’ right to counsel “and the role of the prosecutor”155 and shifting charging authority from court intake officers to county attorneys.156
Intake officers continued to play an essential role in determining which cases to prosecute, and it took time for prosecutors
to exercise their intake authority. Prosecutors’ role often centered
on litigating cases that someone else had chosen to file. The DOJ
studied sixty-eight jurisdictions and found only fifteen in which
prosecutors prepared petitions.157 As Besharov described the situation in 1974, juvenile prosecutors lacked the power of their colleagues that prosecute adults to initiate—or to not initiate—
charges because intake officers continued in practice to make
those determinations.158 Prosecutors exercised their discretion at
a later point—deciding whether to continue prosecuting a case
that someone else had filed.159
In these early years, a split developed regarding the offices in
which juvenile prosecutors would work. The DOJ reported in
1973 that nearly two-thirds of juvenile prosecutors came from local district attorneys’ offices, with the remainder coming from
special juvenile prosecutor offices (19 percent) or city solicitor or

151

Standards Relating to Court Organization and Administration at 17 (cited in note 148).
See Finkelstein, et al, Prosecution in the Juvenile Courts at 12 (cited in note 118).
153 For instance, in 1973, a group of nine police officers in Boston, Massachusetts,
continued to prosecute juvenile delinquency cases. Id at 42.
154 Maricopa County, 594 P2d at 508.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Finkelstein, et al, Prosecution in the Juvenile Courts at 19 (cited in note 118).
158 See Besharov, Juvenile Justice Advocacy: Practice in a Unique Court at 194 (cited
in note 115). See also id at 157–72 (describing court intake and adjustment procedures
without referencing prosecutors).
159 See id at 194–95.
152

2018]

Rethinking Family-Court Prosecutors

775

corporation counsel offices (9 percent).160 Municipal law offices are
civil and thus may have a different office culture. But they operate differently than an agency attorney—they represent the
public or the municipality as a whole and not the agency tasked
with the job.
The purpose of these early post-Gault roles for prosecutors
was not to prosecute more children, but to apply the family court’s
rehabilitative philosophy more effectively. The DOJ, for instance,
highlighted the need for fewer children to be prosecuted in some
jurisdictions and identified greater prosecutorial participation as
an “essential” step to imposing a check on court intake officers
and expanding diversion.161 Entities like DOJ that pushed for
more prosecutorial involvement articulated a commitment to the
historical goals of intake—balancing community protection from
juvenile crime with “promotion of the best interests of juveniles,”
and with the former outweighing the latter only when a child presents a “substantial threat to public safety.”162
California’s post-Gault statutory reforms codified DOJ’s recommended approach. California’s prior statute had charged probation officers with the duty of filing juvenile petitions.163
California amended its statute in 1976 to provide that
prosecutors—and not probation officers—would file delinquency
cases.164 This amendment also explained how probation officers
and prosecutors would interact. Anyone could file a complaint
about alleged delinquency, and the probation officer was still
charged with investigating such complaints to determine whether
to prosecute; when probation officers wanted to prosecute, they

160 See Finkelstein, et al, Prosecution in the Juvenile Courts at 17 (cited in note 118);
Besharov, Juvenile Justice Advocacy: Practice in a Unique Court at 44–46 (cited in note 115).
161 See Finkelstein, et al, Prosecution in the Juvenile Courts at xiv–xvi, 71–74 (cited
in note 118). In some jurisdictions, prosecutorial involvement appeared intended to fill the
absence of “any developed system of intake screening and diversion.” Id at 92.
162 Id at 28, 89.
163 See Cal Welf & Inst Code § 650 (West 1972).
164 Shifting charging authority from probation officers to prosecutors was an explicit
purpose of the statute. Summary Digest for AB 3121, 4 Statutes of California, and Digests
and Measures: 1975–76 Regular Session 283, 285 (1976):

Existing law provides that a proceeding in juvenile court . . . is commenced by
. . . the probation officer filing a petition with the court. This bill . . . would require the probation officer . . . to take a prescribed affidavit to the prosecuting
attorney who is authorized in his discretion to institute proceedings by filing a
petition with the juvenile court.
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would refer cases to prosecutors, who would make a final decision.165 Consistent with a continued rehabilitative purpose, the
statute called for probation officers to do nothing or work with the
family without a court order for up to six months before referring
the case to a prosecutor.166
But soon other states’ reforms illustrated how prosecutorial
control could serve as a tool toward a more punitive juvenile justice system. When Washington state finally codified the prosecutor’s role one decade after Gault, it also amended the purpose
statement of its juvenile code so that it included protecting the
public and holding children “accountable for their offenses,” in addition to the historical focus on rehabilitation of children who
commit crimes.167 With that shift as context, the legislature also
established the role of the prosecuting attorney in juvenile-court
cases.168 The statute established new standards for intake decisions—requiring more serious charges to be prosecuted and less
serious first-time charges to be diverted, and providing discretion
to prosecutors regarding middle-ground charges.169 This statutory
guidance is far more specific than in other states, but still left
prosecutors with discretion to determine what particular charges
to file (and thus, in many cases, to require or permit prosecution
under the diversion statute).170
Washington’s reforms had an immediate and significant impact on charging decisions: total court referrals in King County
(which includes Seattle) increased 60 percent, and felony charges

165 See id (“This bill . . . would require the probation officer, if he determines that lawviolating wardship proceedings should be commenced, to take a prescribed affidavit to the
prosecuting attorney who is authorized in his discretion to institute proceedings by filing
a petition with the juvenile court.”).
166 See id (“Existing law authorizes a probation officer to undertake a program of supervision of a minor for not to exceed 6 months, in lieu of filing a petition or subsequent to
a dismissal of a petition and with parental consent.”).
167 Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 § 55(2), 1977 Wash Laws 1023, 1023–24, codified at
Wash Rev Code § 13.40.010(2). The addition of “accountability” as a core goal led one
scholar to write that the 1977 act “has essentially transformed the former ‘benevolent’
juvenile court into a traditional criminal court system.” Jay A. Reich, The Juvenile Justice
Act of 1977: A Prosecutor’s Perspective, 14 Gonzaga L Rev 337, 341 (1979). Given the continued focus on rehabilitation in the purpose clause, that view perhaps exaggerates the
impact.
168 Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 § 63, 1977 Wash Laws at 1032, Wash Rev Code
§ 13.40.090 (“The county prosecuting attorney shall be a party to all juvenile court
proceedings involving juvenile offenders or alleged juvenile offenders.”).
169 Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 § 61(3)–(6), 1977 Wash Laws at 1029–30, Wash Rev
Code § 13.40.070(b)(5)–(8).
170 See Reich, 14 Gonzaga L Rev at 346–48 (cited in note 167).
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more than doubled.171 Some prosecutors expressed concern that
they were not well equipped to determine which teenagers required prosecution,172 but those sharp increases suggest that, at
least in the aggregate, prosecutors resolved any such angst in favor of more frequent prosecution.
Over the 1980s and 1990s, the role of prosecutors changed,
resembling Washington’s post-Gault statutory reforms more than
California’s. Increasing juvenile crime rates, racialized fear of increasing crime, and decreasing faith in rehabilitation triggered
“tough-on-crime” reforms.173 These reforms were remarkable in
their speed and scope—forty-seven states and the District of
Columbia enacted legislation imposing more severe sentences on
juveniles between 1992 and 1996.174 These reforms included two
key categories. First, they expanded the number of children who
states could try in criminal court—by lowering the ages, expanding the list of crimes that could trigger a waiver to criminal court,
permitting repeat offenders to be waived, and in some states,
granting prosecutors authority to directly file cases in criminal
court.175 Second, legislatures tied more juvenile dispositions to the
specific offense(s) adjudicated.176
These reforms indicated an essential shift in the role of the
prosecutor; they also leveraged that shift, coupled with prosecutors’ increased intake authority, to effect a broader change in the
juvenile justice system. Juvenile prosecutors were no longer the
inheritors of the family court’s historical role of balancing community protection with juvenile offenders’ rehabilitation and
other needs. Now, prosecutors were the instruments of reforms
that followed a more punitive and less rehabilitative approach.
These reforms shifted authority to juvenile prosecutors through
exercise of their relatively new charging authority.177 By determining what charges to file, prosecutors could determine whether

171 Total referrals in July and August 1977 were 1,906, and total referrals in July and
August 1978 were 3,046, a 60 percent increase. Total felony charges increased from 425 in
those two months in 1977 to 855 in 1978, a 101 percent increase. Id at 351.
172 See id at 348–49.
173 See generally Barry Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court—Part II: Race
and the “Crack Down” on Youth Crime, 84 Minn L Rev 327 (1999).
174 See Patricia Torbet, et al, State Responses to Serious and Violent Juvenile Crime
*59 (OJJDP, 1996), archived at http://perma.cc/39Y9-JHAU.
175 See id at *3–9.
176 The precise method varied—including blended sentencing, mandatory minimum
commitments, and extended family-court jurisdiction. See id at *11–15.
177 See Beale, 44 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 522 (cited in note 43).
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to trigger any of the new offense-based provisions. Contemporaneous observers readily concluded that the reforms’ aggregate effect was to shift power from judges to prosecutors178 and to do so
because the “prevailing sentiment [was] that juvenile court judges
are too ‘soft’ on juvenile crime; . . . and that nonjudicial [prosecutorial] decisions are more likely” to take a tougher approach.179
Indeed, while prosecutors are not monolithic, empirical evidence soon emerged to show that they effectuated more punitive
decisions following these reforms. Professors Donna Bishop and
Charles Frazier surveyed a set of Florida prosecutors soon after
waiver reforms were enacted and found that “nearly half” espoused a punitive philosophy “completely antithetical to the basic
precepts traditionally associated with juvenile justice.”180 Prosecutors increased their use of waiver,181 even in cases involving
children who were not “serious and chronic offenders.”182 And
studies of other jurisdictions revealed that granting prosecutors
the authority to trigger more severe sentences led to prosecutors
doing precisely that.183 Some recent legislative and judicial developments that limit prosecutorial waiver reflect the concern that
prosecutors would have an overly punitive perspective. Most
prominently, California voters in 2016 enacted Proposition 57,
which ended prosecutorial direct file and restored judicial waiver
as the norm. One of the proposition’s explicit purposes was

178 See Torbet, et al, State Responses to Serious and Violent Juvenile Crime at *60
(cited in note 174).
179 Id. Critics of these developments put the concern more bluntly—echoing Fox’s
argument from the immediate post-Gault period. Prosecutors, the critics argued, “historically have been more concerned with retribution than with rehabilitation.” Bishop
and Frazier, 5 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at 285 (cited in note 63) (summarizing
criticisms).
180 Bishop and Frazier, 5 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at 291 (cited in note
63). Bishop and Frazier categorized prosecutors’ philosophies as “pure just deserts,”
“modified just deserts,” and those who endorsed a more traditional, rehabilitationfocused view. See id at 290–91.
181 See id at 292.
182 Id at 297.
183 See, for example, Marcy R. Podkopacz and Barry C. Feld, The Back-Door to Prison:
Waiver Reform, “Blended Sentencing,” and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 91 J
Crim L & Crimin 997, 1009, 1023–24 (2001) (finding significant expansion of more severe
sentencing following a law granting prosecutors greater authority to seek waiver and “extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution”—which provided for longer sentences within
family court).
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“[s]topping the revolving door of crime by emphasizing rehabilitation, especially for juveniles,” implying that prosecutors were
not adequately “emphasizing rehabilitation.”184
Scholars have tended to focus on more frequent waivers of
family-court jurisdiction and the growing prevalence of tough dispositions in delinquency cases,185 but prosecutors’ increasing
power and their increasingly punitive approach had important effects throughout the juvenile justice system. Studies of the organizational culture of family court found that these trends increased
those courts’ adversarial tone and “punitive climate.”186
Crucially, prosecutors’ increasing authority had an essential
impact on intake decisions. At the same time as those other reforms occurred, prosecutors began using their charging discretion
to prosecute a greater percentage of children referred to family
court, thus diverting fewer. Prior to the tough-on-crime reforms,
more cases were diverted or dismissed than formally processed;
45.7 percent of cases were formally prosecuted in 1985.187
Although older data are less reliable, earlier surveys suggested
similar numbers.188 The percentage of cases prosecuted shifted up,
peaking at 57.3 percent in 1998 and 1999.189 Juvenile crime and
the total number of juvenile delinquency cases has dropped dramatically since the 1990s, but the percentage of cases prosecuted
remains in the mid-fifties, close to its peak reached during the era
of tough-on-crime reforms.190 That is, the shift to prosecutorial
184 People v Superior Court, 2018 WL 652425, *5 (Cal) (quoting the Proposition 57
voter information guide). In 2018, the California Supreme Court held that Proposition 57
applied retroactively, which took power away from district attorneys, who would not be
“neutral” arbiters; reducing prosecutors’ power served as a means to reduce sentences and
provide an “ameliorating benefit” to defendants. Id.
185 See Feld, 84 Minn L Rev at 327 (cited in note 173).
186 Alexes Harris, Diverting and Abdicating Judicial Discretion: Cultural, Political, and
Procedural Dynamics in California Juvenile Justice, 41 L & Society Rev 387, 421–23 (2007).
187 Statistical Briefing Book: Juveniles in Court—Manner of Handling (OJJDP), archived at http://perma.cc/NC7Q-ZU6E (reflecting that the Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention formally handled 530,300 cases out of 1,159,400 cases in 1985).
This website links to data that provide specific numbers for each year.
188 One national study found that 52 percent of all family-court referrals made in 1957
were handled “pre-judicially”—that is, without prosecution. The figure was “substantially
the same” in 1964. The Administration of Juvenile Justice at 14 (cited in note 87). Another
study comparing national longitudinal survey of youth data similarly finds a significant
increase in the likelihood that authorities would prosecute rather than divert a child. See
Stevens and Morash, 13 Youth Violence & Juv Just at 89 (cited in note 38).
189 Statistical Briefing Book: Juveniles in Court (cited in note 187) (memorializing the
3,538,600 cases total in 1998 and 1999, with 2,027,900 formally pursued).
190 From 2004–2013, the figure ranged from a low of 53.4 percent in 2010 to 55.6 percent in 2006. In the most recent year available, 2014, the rate was 55.6 percent. Id. The
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control coincides with a lasting 10 percent increase in the proportion of cases prosecuted, and a concomitant decrease in the number of cases diverted. Although it is difficult to prove causation
empirically, it seems likely that the shift to prosecutorial control
contributed to this shift.191 This shift has a tremendous effect—a
10 percent increase in the number of cases prosecuted amounts to
more than 100,000 more cases prosecuted every year.192
In practice in many jurisdictions, prosecutors’ offices took on
decisive roles in making charging decisions even when intake officers had a statutory role. In 1995, Professor Joseph Tulman described how intake officers frequently failed to comply with their
statutory mandate to determine which children truly needed
family-court attention.193 In multiple cases, Tulman and his students in a law school juvenile defense clinic observed the social
factors inquiry entirely absent or overruled by prosecutors considering other factors.194 In some cases, prosecutors’ office staff
even completed forms that intake officers were supposed to complete.195 In others, intake officers recommended charging particular children to accommodate prosecutors, even without doing a
required investigation.196 The bottom line in practice was that
“the prosecutor had usurped the function of the intake probation
officer,” de-emphasizing, if not erasing, the statutorily mandated
consideration of social factors.197
One result of de-emphasizing social factors in intake was to
weaken what ought to be a powerful check on what became known
as the school-to-prison pipeline. Normal adolescent behavior198—
such as minor fights or disobedience to school authorities—calls

DOJ has reported this trend elsewhere. See Delinquency Cases in Juvenile Court, 2013 at
*3 (cited in note 21) (“The proportion of delinquency cases petitioned for formal handling
rose from 46% in 1985 to 57% in the late 1990s and then declined slightly to 55% in 2013.”).
191 See Charles Lindner, Probation Intake: Gatekeeper to the Family Court, 72 Fed
Probation 48, 52 (June 2008) (“The increase in the number of petitioned cases may be due,
at least in part, to greater prosecutorial control in many courts.”).
192 There are more than one million delinquency cases every year. See Delinquency
Cases in Juvenile Court, 2013 at *2 (cited in note 21).
193 See Tulman, 3 DC L Rev at 235–36 (cited in note 150).
194 See id at 238, 244.
195 See id at 237–44.
196 See id at 244.
197 Tulman, 3 DC L Rev at 244 (cited in note 150).
198 See Henning, 98 Cornell L Rev at 397–401 (cited in note 10) (“Reckless behavior,
including the delinquent activity described here, is so common among adolescents that it
has been described as virtually a normative characteristic of adolescent development.”)
(quotation marks omitted).
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for school discipline but generally not prosecution. Intake procedure should screen out such cases; absent more severe facts or
repeat incidents, these cases represent behavior that teenagers
are very likely to simply grow out of, rendering any court rehabilitation unnecessary.199 For relatively less severe charges, prosecuting children can impose lasting harms, such as reduced high
school graduation200 and increased reoffending rates.201 Moreover,
children with disabilities whose behavior may be a manifestation
of their disability, or who may not have received adequate special
education services, generally do not need rehabilitation in family
court—they need good special education services.202 Similarly,
children who have mental health conditions or family problems
that trigger behavioral difficulties at school deserve interventions
tailored to those problems before the state prosecutes them.
This prosecutorial, rather than rehabilitative, mindset is illustrated by South Carolina’s experience with charges for “disturbing schools.”203 One recent high-profile case involved a student at Spring Valley High School in Columbia, South Carolina,
charged with disturbing schools for refusing a teacher’s and assistant principal’s instruction to put her cell phone away. The
teacher called a school administrator, who called the school resource officer—a deputy sheriff assigned to the school—who
pulled the child out of her desk and dragged her across the classroom floor. Other students recorded the incident on their cell
phones, leading to significant critical attention, both of the officer’s use of force and his ability to charge the student with the
crime of “disturbing schools” for the student’s relatively minor
misbehavior.204 Faced with public calls to dismiss the charge, the
prosecutor said he would make charging decisions “based only on
evidence and in accordance with the law”—without any reference
to the historical social factors that are supposed to guide intake

199 See id at 400 (“As youth grow and mature, their cognitive and psychological capacities improve.”).
200 See note 27 and accompanying text.
201 See text accompanying note 26.
202 Willis, 2016 BYU Educ & L J at 192–95, 204–06 (cited in note 62).
203 SC Code Ann § 16-17-420.
204 The case received much attention following the release of video showing the officer
pulling the child out of her desk and dragging her across the classroom floor. The chief
local elected prosecutor issued a public investigative summary making clear that the officer arrested the student solely for her classroom behavior. See Letter from Fifth Judicial
Circuit Solicitor Dan Johnson to Captain John Bishop *1–2 (Sept 2, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/NLZ8-RX9G (“Johnson Letter”).
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decisions, and without articulating why charging a student for refusing a teacher’s command would serve any rehabilitative purpose.205 When the prosecutor eventually dismissed the charge, he
said he believed the student was guilty but that he likely could
not convict her.206 The prosecutor again engaged in no analysis of
whether prosecuting the child served any rehabilitative purpose.207 That prosecutorial mindset extends beyond a single case.
Aggregate statistics regarding disturbing-schools charges208 illustrate how prosecutors choose to prosecute more cases than juvenile justice agency staff or court intake officers would. Data released by the state Department of Juvenile Justice reveal that
over a five-and-a-half-year period, South Carolina prosecutors
overruled department recommendations for diversion and prosecuted 1,564 cases, about 20 percent of all cases the department
recommended for diversion.209
D. Child Protection Prosecutors Reform
As with delinquency law, the evolution of child protection
family-court prosecutors began with ambiguous post-Gault commentary. Many child protection authorities recommended placing
prosecutorial discretion in the executive branch, but were not
clear whether they should reside with prosecutors, child protection agencies, or some other entity. The ABA’s 1980 standards,
for instance, recommended placing prosecutorial authority in the
executive branch, but declined to explain who specifically should
determine which child protection cases to file.210

205 See Statement of Fifth Judicial Circuit Solicitor Dan Johnson (Dec 17, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8T6M-3XBF. See also Solicitor: No Involvement in Charges
against Spring Valley HS Teens until FBI Investigation Over (WSMV-TV Nashville, Dec
16, 2015), online at http://www.wsmv.com/story/30763259/black-parents-association
-wants-charges-against-teens-dropped (visited Nov 13, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable)
(describing advocates’ efforts and the solicitor’s response).
206 See Johnson Letter at *11 (cited in note 204).
207 See id.
208 There were 1,222 disturbing-schools referrals in 2014–2015, making disturbing
schools the second most frequent charge in the state. See 2014–2015 Annual Statistical
Report at *13–14 (cited in note 34).
209 See Declaration of Megan French Marcelin in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motions for
Class Certification and Preliminary Injunction, Kenny v Wilson, Civil Action No 16-2794,
*5 (D SC filed Aug 16, 2016).
210 See Standards Relating to Court Organization and Administration at 5–6 (cited
in note 148).
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Family-court prosecutors in child protection law developed in
a manner that more strongly emphasized the role of administrative agencies than in delinquency cases. Comprehensive child protection agencies developed that operated central child protection
intake hotlines, conducted child protection investigations, managed child abuse and neglect registries, and operated foster care
systems. These agencies soon supplanted court intake officers and
often effectively determined which cases to file in family court.
Some states granted child protection agencies the authority to file
cases directly, while others granted elected prosecutors’ offices
that power. Between those two options, no national norm developed, and “great[ ] variation” has existed between states.211
Even without a national norm, child protection agencies
could wield great influence over intake decisions. These agencies
conduct their own investigations and bring cases to the executivebranch lawyer who could proceed with the case or not. The lawyer
is not likely to file a case that the agency did not want to file—
absent a nonagency actor bringing such a case to a prosecutor’s
attention (which, as discussed in Part III.C, remains possible in
many states), the prosecutor would simply not know about it.
Justice William Brennan recognized the “Department’s control
over the decision whether to take steps to protect a particular
child from suspected abuse” regardless of whether formal authority to take such steps rested with the agency or an elected
prosecutor.212
The interaction between child protection agencies and their
executive-branch lawyers remained fraught, especially when
those lawyers worked for local prosecutor’s offices. Professor
David Herring reported the observations of such attorneys in
Michigan in the 1980s. In many counties, child protection cases
were typically assigned to junior attorneys in the prosecutor’s

211 Mark Hardin, Role of the Legal and Judicial System for Children, Youth, and
Families in Foster Care, in Gerald P. Mallon and Peg McCartt Hess, eds, Child Welfare
for the Twenty-First Century: A Handbook of Practices, Policies, and Programs 687, 692–
93 (Columbia 2d ed 2005). Compare also, for example, 10A Okla Stat Ann §§ 1-4-301, 1-4901 (granting the district attorney rights to file all child protection cases), with, for example, SC Code Ann § 63-7-1660(A) (authorizing the Department of Social Services to petition the family court).
212 DeShaney v Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 US 189, 209
(1989) (Brennan dissenting). Even when the agency lacked its own lawyer, Brennan concluded that the agency’s discretion was only “subject to the approval of the local government’s corporation counsel,” and so “the buck effectively stopped with the Department.”
Id (Brennan dissenting).
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offices and, “where this occurs, the juvenile court becomes a training arena for inexperienced assistant prosecutors.”213 Prosecutors
would often cause delays in cases by failing to appear at preliminary and dispositional hearings.214 Prosecutors would not offer
“active legal consultation” to agency staff during the life of
cases.215 And prosecutors would exercise their authority to override the agency’s wishes regarding whether and how to proceed
in cases.216
Such critiques lead to something close to a majority view
within the child protection literature—though with one notable
exception and, as we shall see in Part III.A, without achieving a
consensus in state laws. That majority favors representation of
child protection agencies by agency attorneys, with agencies empowered to make intake decisions. By 1999, the Department of
Health and Human Services endorsed the view that lawyers
should represent child protection agencies—not the state more
broadly—and that agency lawyers should counsel agency staff
from early points in a case.217 The ABA made similar recommendations in its 2004 “Standards of Practice for Lawyers
Representing Child Welfare Agencies,” whose title aptly referred
to lawyers for agencies, not states. Agency representation would
respect agencies’ knowledge of specific families and the child protection field, the ABA argued, while a prosecutorial model would
risk the substitution of “political agendas” and lawyers’ “personal
beliefs” for agency knowledge.218
The child protection literature focuses strongly on the question of who a lawyer represents—the agency, the state, or people
more broadly.219 If the agency is the client, the lawyer can advise
agency staff about the legal basis for a potential court action, or
how a particular decision can support broader agency goals, but
213 David J. Herring, Legal Representation for the State Child Welfare Agency in Civil
Child Protection Proceedings: A Comparative Study, 24 U Toledo L Rev 603, 608 (1993).
214 See id at 609.
215 Id.
216 See id at 609–10.
217 See Donald N. Duquette and Mark Hardin, Guidelines for Public Policy and State
Legislation Governing Permanence for Children VII-8 to -11 (Children’s Bureau 1999).
218 American Bar Association, Standards of Practice for Lawyers Representing Child
Welfare Agencies *3–4 (2004), available at http://perma.cc/W4HM-QN5C. See also Mimi
Laver, Foundations for Success: Strengthening Your Agency Attorney Office 112–14 (ABA
1999) (contrasting an agency model with prosecutors who “get the final word” and disregard agency staff views).
219 See, for example, Standards of Practice for Lawyers Representing Child Welfare
Agencies at *3–4 (cited in note 218).
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must ultimately abide by the agency’s decisions regarding case
objectives and let the agency make core decisions, such as
whether to file a case. If a lawyer disagrees with a caseworker’s
opinion on a case, the lawyer could consult more senior agency
staff but would be bound by the client’s ultimate direction.220 But
if the lawyer represents the amorphous “state” or “the people,”
then the lawyer has freer rein to determine what the client
wants.221 And the lawyer also then “abdicates” the job of counseling the agency—because the agency is not a client to be advised.222
More general agency principles weigh strongly against attorneys
for agencies using their own views to overrule an agency’s wishes
about litigation.223
In contrast, Besharov suggested granting child protection
prosecutors the authority to determine whether a case that the
agency wished to file ought to have been diverted, and whether a
case that the agency does not wish to file nonetheless needs court
attention.224 Besharov wrote in 1981, before the commentators
discussed above, and so did not respond to them and did not, in
particular, explain why counseling the agency client about the filing decision would not suffice. Besharov did acknowledge that his
proposal would cause conflicts between child protection prosecutors and agencies, but he suggested that “if such conflicts are handled with tact and mutual respect, then a resolution, or at least a
modus vivendi, will be reached—in much the same way that the
police and district attorneys have accommodated themselves to
their frequently conflicting perspectives.”225
The debate between Besharov’s position and the more recent
arguments for agency control remains unresolved in the law.
When a lawyer working for a local prosecutor’s office handles
child protection cases, disputes have arisen about who such a lawyer represents—and there is no uniform answer. In West
Virginia, the child protection agency won a ruling requiring local
prosecutors to treat it as the client and thus defer to its wishes on

220 Some boundaries would remain—a lawyer could not, for instance, file a petition
without an adequate legal or factual basis.
221 See Laver, Foundations for Success at 112–14 (cited in note 218); Herring, 24 U
Toledo L Rev at 623 (cited in note 213).
222 See Herring, 24 U Toledo L Rev at 624 (cited in note 213).
223 See Beth Nolan, Removing Conflicts from the Administration of Justice:
Conflicts of Interest and Independent Counsels under the Ethics in Government Act, 79
Georgetown L J 1, 36–43 (1990).
224 See Besharov, 6 Vt L Rev at 412 (cited in note 3).
225 Id at 412–13.
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core case decisions.226 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine ruled
instead that prosecutors represented the “public interest,” leaving the agency as something other than the prosecutor’s client
and subject to the prosecutor’s view of a case.227 This distinction
is evident in state agencies’ responses to an ABA survey regarding their representation models in 2009. Agencies split evenly—
twenty-one reported that lawyers were agency staff or contractors
and twenty-one reported that they were prosecutors or county attorneys.228 But a stronger majority reported that the agency was
seen as the client; thirty-six jurisdictions reported that lawyers
represented the agency (even if the lawyers worked at the local
prosecutor’s office), while nine states reported that they represent
the people.229
III. THE CURRENT INCONSISTENT LANDSCAPE
Descriptively, states have not consistently resolved key questions about family-court prosecutors in either juvenile delinquency or child protection cases. Inconsistencies across states reflect the absence of a settled structural understanding of who
should make essential intake decisions and how they should
make them. This Part offers the first accounting of how varying
state laws govern delinquency and child protection prosecutors.
Differences range across two related questions. First, who is
the government lawyer—an agency lawyer, a lawyer in an elected
prosecutor’s office, or some other kind of lawyer? Embedded in
this question is who that lawyer represents—a specific agency, or
the state or people writ large? Second, what role do administrative agencies play in deciding which cases to prosecute and which
to dismiss or divert? When the lawyer involved works for and represents a specific agency, that agency has authority to exercise
this prosecutorial discretion. But in the majority of other cases—

226

See In re Jonathan G., 482 SE2d 893, 908–10 (W Va 1996).
See Superintendent of Insurance v Attorney General, 558 A2d 1197, 1199–1200
(Me 1989).
228 The survey reported agencies’ understanding of their states’ representation models, not actual statutes. Seventeen jurisdictions reported a statewide agency lawyer model
and four reported a county-based agency lawyer model. Twelve reported a county-based
prosecutorial model, while nine reported a statewide prosecutorial model. Six states reported some other system, often a hybrid. Ramon Ruiz and Scott Trowbridge, National
Survey of Child Welfare Legal Representation Models 3 (ABA Center on Children and the
Law 2009). The data were based on responses from forty-six states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Navajo Nation. Id at 2.
229 Id at 6.
227

2018]

Rethinking Family-Court Prosecutors

787

in many states for child protection cases, and in almost all states
for delinquency cases—the precise balance of power between
prosecutor and agency and the role of each is essential to understanding intake decisions.
Complicating matters further, many states’ laws maintain
vestiges of family courts’ pre-Gault structures—especially the
ability of private individuals to file child protection or delinquency cases and the significant role that court-employed intake
officers exercise in charging decisions. This Part surveys state
laws regarding family-court prosecutors in juvenile delinquency,
then child protection cases, and then explores these pre-Gault
vestiges.
A.

Juvenile Delinquency Prosecutors

In juvenile delinquency cases, the biggest variety in state law
and practice is the interaction between an agency with some
intake role—a state department of juvenile justice, or an executive- or judicial-branch probation department—and prosecutors.
Prosecutors more uniformly work for an independent executivebranch office—a division of the local elected prosecutor in most
states, or for the local municipality’s corporation counsel (or city
or county attorney, or the like) in other states.
The relative power and role of intake officers and prosecutors
“var[ies] widely.”230 Earlier authors have placed the relationship
between intake officers and prosecutors along a spectrum. At one
end, intake officers hold most of the power, determining which
cases to divert or dismiss and which to file; prosecutors review
only those cases that intake officers wish to file, and review them
only for legal sufficiency. At the other end, prosecutors review all
delinquency referrals and determine whether to prosecute them,
with various gradations between the two poles.231
Yet in the existing literature, “[n]o national inventory exists
to document which arrangement is most common or how intake

230

See Lindner, 72 Fed Probation at 48 (cited in note 191).
See Carrie J. Petrucci and H. Ted Rubin, Juvenile Court, Bridging the Past and
the Future, in Albert R. Roberts, ed, Juvenile Justice Sourcebook: Past, Present, and Future
248, 264 (Oxford 2004). Professor Carrie J. Petrucci and Judge H. Ted Rubin identify three
points in between: intake officers have intake authority for specific charges, with limits
for more serious charges; intake officers may recommend decisions to prosecutors, who can
both prosecute a case recommended for diversion and divert a case recommended for prosecution; and intake officers may make recommendations regarding less serious charges,
but prosecutors make all intake decisions for more serious charges. Id.
231
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practices actually work in practice.”232 This Section provides an
inventory of current statutory structures. Variation exists along
two planes in these statutes. First is the question of which offices
employ juvenile prosecutors. In most states, elected prosecutors
(district attorneys, county attorneys, or states attorneys) prosecute children in family court, but a minority of states assign that
task to a different office or permit different practices in different
parts of the state. The second plane is the precise balance of power
between family-court prosecutors and nonlawyer intake officials.
Both planes are reflected in Figure 1. Categorizing state statutes
along this spectrum involves some classification questions, which
are explored in the footnotes.
At the latter end of the spectrum, thirteen states grant prosecutors complete or near-complete authority over intake decisions. These states’ statutes charge prosecutors with evaluating
complaints filed against children and determining whether to dismiss, divert, or prosecute those cases. Eleven of these states
assign such power to elected prosecutors,233 while two assign this
power to other executive-branch attorneys or permit varying
practices around the state.234
Ten more states give prosecutors authority to make these intake decisions, but require probation officers or juvenile justice
agency staff to give prosecutors intake recommendations first.
Nine of these states give elected prosecutors this authority,235
while a tenth state permits either elected prosecutors or other
executive-branch attorneys to do so.236

232

See Mears, The Front End of Juvenile Court at 576 (cited in note 18).
See Ariz Rev Stat §§ 8-301(2), 8-326; Colo Rev Stat §§ 19-2-106, 19-2-512; La Children’s Code Ann Arts 839, 842; Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 119, § 54; Minn Stat Ann
§ 260B.141(4); Minn Rule Juv Delinq Proc 6.02(2); SD Cod Laws §§ 26-7A-9 to -10; Tex
Fam Code Ann §§ 51.02(11), 53.012; 33 Vt Stat Ann § 5201; 3 Vt Stat Ann § 163; Wash
Rev Code § 13.40.070; W Va Code §§ 49-4-503 to -504; Wyo Stat Ann § 14-6-211. Several
variations exist within these states. Arizona family-court judges retain discretion to divert
cases involving first-time misdemeanants. Ariz Rev Stat § 8-307(A). Washington prosecutors may delegate intake decisions regarding misdemeanors to probation counselors. Wash
Rev Code § 13.40.070(10).
234 See Del Fam Ct Rule Crim Proc 7; Neb Rev Stat § 43-274 (granting the county
attorney—the regular county prosecutor—or the city attorney power to offer diversion or
file charges).
235 See Ark Code Ann §§ 9-27-310(b)(1), (d), 9-27-323(a); Idaho Code §§ 20-510 to -511;
705 ILCS Stat §§ 405/5-305, 405/5-330; Ind Code §§ 31-37-8-5 to -6; Kan Stat Ann §§ 382230, 38-2233, 38-2327; Ky Rev Stat Ann §§ 610.030, 635.010; NM Stat Ann §§ 32A-16(A), 32A-2-7, 32A-2-8; 10A Okla Stat Ann § 2-2-104(A); SC Code Ann § 63-19-1010.
236 See NY Fam Ct Law §§ 254, 308.1.
233
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In the middle of the spectrum, one state’s statute assigns
shared intake authority to elected prosecutors and intake staff.237
Further down the spectrum are states that give greater authority to intake officers employed by probation departments or
the family court itself. Eight states and the District of Columbia
grant intake officers or agency staff power to decide whether to
divert a child, subject to review by prosecutors only when the complainant or law enforcement appeals a diversion decision. Eight
of these jurisdictions assign elected prosecutors to this role,238 and
one assigns other executive-branch attorneys.239
At the far end of the spectrum, sixteen states empower intake
officers, agency staff, or the family court itself to make intake decisions. Ten of these assign elected prosecutors to represent the
state when intake officers recommend prosecution,240 and five either assign to other executive-branch attorneys the role of prosecuting children or permit varying practices around the state.241
Two states are outliers: Alaska is unique because it grants
its juvenile justice agency complete charging authority, and
grants that agency its own lawyers.242 Missouri is an outlier

237 See NH Rev Stat Ann § 169-B:10 (authorizing the prosecutor, police, or probation
officer to refer children to diversion programs).
238 See Cal Welf & Inst Code §§ 653, 653.5, 653.7, 655; Fla Stat Ann §§ 985.15,
985.145; Iowa Code §§ 232.12, 232.28, 232.35; 15 Me Rev Stat Ann § 3301; Mont Code Ann
§§ 41-5-1202, 41-5-1204 to -1205, 41-5-1401; Nev Rev Stat § 62C.100; NC Gen Stat §§ 7B1702 to -1705; Va Code §§ 16.1-232, 16.1-260(B), (E)–(F).
239 See DC Code §§ 16-2305, 16-2305.02.
240 See Ala Code Ann §§ 12-15-105, 12-15-118, 12-15-119, 12-15-120; Ala Rules Juv
Proc 12, 15; Ga Code Ann §§ 15-11-68, 15-11-520, 15-18-6.1, 15-11-515; Md Ct & Jud Proceedings Code Ann § 3-8A-10 (giving intake officers authority to make diversion decisions
in misdemeanor cases but state attorneys’ power in felony cases); Mich Comp Laws
§§ 712A.11, 722.823; Miss Code §§ 43-21-117, 43-21-357, 43-21-451; NJ Stat Ann
§§ 2A:4A-71, 2A:4A-72; ND Cent Code §§ 27-20-10, 27-20-19, 27-20-20; Ohio Rev Code Ann
§ 2151.14; Ohio Rule Juv Proc 9; In re N.K., 2003 WL 23009113, *3 (Ohio App) (“[T]he pursuit of a delinquency complaint under Juv. R. 9 remains a matter for judicial discretion.”);
42 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 6304, 6323(a)(2), 6336(b); Utah Code Ann § 78A-6-602(2)(c); Wis Stat
§§ 938.06, 938.067, 938.09, 938.24(5). This category also includes some variation. Both
Mississippi and New Jersey subject intake officer decisions to court review but do not permit
prosecutors to reject an intake officer’s decision to divert a case unilaterally. See Miss Code
§§ 43-21-117, 43-21-357, 43-21-451; NJ Stat Ann § 2A:4A-71, 2A:4A-72.
241 See Conn Gen Stat §§ 46b-121b, 46b-128; Haw Rev Stat §§ 571-21, 571-31.2, 57162; Or Rev Stat §§ 419C.225, 419C.250; RI Gen Laws § 14-1-11; Tenn Code Ann §§ 37-1110, 37-1-124(b).
242 See Alaska Stat Ann §§ 47.12.040, 47.12.060, 47.12.065, 47.12.110 (giving the
Department of Health and Social Services authority to determine which to divert and
which to prosecute, and giving district attorneys authority to prosecute only more serious
cases that are referred by the department).
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because it does not provide any executive-branch lawyer; it follows a pre-Gault model of court staff and court staff attorneys
making all charging decisions.243
FIGURE 1. THE SPECTRUM OF PROSECUTORIAL AND INTAKE
OFFICER CONTROL UNDER STATE STATUTES
 More Prosecutorial Control
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This spectrum describes each state’s governing statutes. It
does not explore varying practices that may occur within states
whose statutes place them at different points of the spectrum.244
For instance, states that give prosecutors ultimate authority to
make intake decisions but require intake officers or juvenile justice agencies to provide recommendations may have varying practices. Some local prosecutors may take those recommendations in
nearly every case—effectively delegating intake authority to intake officers—while others may more actively assert their intake
authority. Some intake officers with the authority to make intake
decisions may exercise it fully, while others may defer in practice

243 See Mo Rev Stat §§ 211.081, 211.401; Mo S Ct Rule 116.03. At least one courtemployed prosecutor has described Missouri’s system as “pre-Gault,” a description endorsed
by the National Juvenile Defender Center. Mary Ann Scali, et al, Missouri: Justice
Rationed—an Assessment of Access to Counsel and Quality of Juvenile Defense
Representation in Delinquency Proceedings 37–38 (National Juvenile Defender Center 2013).
244 See Birckhead, 46 Tex Tech L Rev at 164 (cited in note 19) (describing varying
practices).
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to the expressed or perceived wishes of prosecutors or face significant pressures to do so.245
B.

Child Protection Prosecutors

In child protection cases, some states assign lawyers to work
directly for and represent child protection agencies, and empower
these agencies to determine which cases to file.246 Other states,
however, assign other legal offices—especially local district attorney offices or state attorney general offices.247 Some of these lawyers are assigned by state law to represent child protection agencies, while others operate like elected criminal prosecutors—
representing “the people” and relying on their own judgment or
prosecutor office policies regarding that client’s interests rather
than direction from an agency client.248
Although no trend has yet emerged, several states have recently wrestled with whether to assign child protection agencies
or elected prosecutors with charging discretion and with the identity and role of executive-branch lawyers.249 The Oregon legislature created a task force to develop a representation model for the
state in child protection cases,250 which recommended that the
child protection agency use its funds to pay the state department
of justice to represent the agency251—a change from Oregon’s current prosecutorial model.252 This shift would address concerns
that the child protection agency frequently lacks representation
245

See Tulman, 3 DC L Rev at 235–44 (cited in note 150) (describing the latter scenario).
See note 264 and accompanying text.
247 See note 265 and accompanying text.
248 See notes 259–62 and accompanying text.
249 The issue has also arisen in at least one local jurisdiction. One rural Wisconsin
county district attorney, citing a lack of resources, announced that his office would no
longer represent the state in child protection cases, leading to a temporary appointment
of a special prosecutor to handle both child protection and delinquency cases. See Tim
Greenwood, State to Pay for Special Prosecutor (Eagle Herald, July 27, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/2THH-CJAQ.
250 See Governor Kate Brown, Task Force on Legal Representation in Childhood
Dependency (Oregon.gov), archived at http://perma.cc/RM57-34NH, citing SB 222, 2015 Or
Laws 2108.
251 See Oregon Task Force on Dependency Representation, Report July 2016 *5–6
(2016), archived at http://perma.cc/B2XV-FCBJ (“Oregon Task Force Final Report”). The
report made clear that local district attorneys could continue to represent “‘the people’ as
opposed to the agency,” but at their own expense—“limited DHS funds should be allocated
to provide full representation for the agency.” Id at *28.
252 See Ruiz and Trowbridge, National Survey of Child Welfare Legal Representation
Models at 10 (cited in note 228) (reporting Oregon’s description of its prosecutorial model,
in which the local district attorney would represent the state, not the agency, and “need
not take the same position as” the agency).
246
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when a case begins.253 Florida has engaged in controversial shifts,
moving first to agency lawyers and then to a prosecutorial model,
which has been criticized recently.254 In 2013, Iowa moved toward
a prosecutorial model, amending its statutes to require county attorneys to represent the state, not the child protection agency as
it had previously done.255 In 2015, following academic256 and
DOJ257 criticism of Missouri’s “juvenile officer” mode of selecting
which cases to file, the Missouri Supreme Court ordered modest
changes to that structure.258
The landscape remains varied across the country. One state
surveyed its peers in 2015 and found a variety of employers of
state attorneys and a variety of roles for those attorneys.259 Only
seven states reported having in-house agency counsel, three
states reported representation by local prosecutors’ offices, and
nine states reported representation by the attorney general.260

253

See id at 14.
Through the 1980s, caseworkers often appeared unrepresented, until the Florida
Supreme Court declared that to be the unauthorized practice of law and required the
agency to prevent such practice by 1990. The Florida Bar in re Advisory Opinion HRS
Nonlawyer Counselor, 547 S2d 909, 909 (Fla 1989). The state responded by creating
agency lawyers—the statewide Child Welfare Legal Services Department, housed within
the agency and understood to represent the agency. Florida Department of Children and
Families, Report: Dependency Roles Workgroup *14 (2016), online at http://
floridapolitics.com/archives/tag/dependency-roles-workgroup (visited Dec 26, 2017)
(Perma archive unavailable). In 2008, however, “the Department began implementing
. . . the ‘prosecutorial model,’” in which “attorneys have described their allegiance primarily to ‘the State of Florida,’ rather than to [the agency].” Id at *8. No legislation
accompanied this shift, so it is not clear how the department justified it. By 2016, a
state-sponsored report criticized this shift for resulting in lawyers making “decisions
that more properly belong” to the agency. Id.
255 See HF 119 §§ 2–3, 2013 Iowa Acts 386, 386–87, codified at Iowa Code §§ 232.90,
232.114. The legislation explicitly distinguishes representing the agency from representing the state, and followed lobbying by county attorneys to “restore the CA’s role as the
independent voice of ‘the People’ in [Child in Need of Assistance] and [termination of parental rights] prosecutions.” Iowa Department of Human Services, Summary of Charge
from House File 608 *3 (2011), archived at http://perma.cc/KN5Q-L2AG. The statute permits the agency to seek intervention by the attorney general in case of “disagreement between the department and the county attorney.” Iowa Code § 232.90(3).
256 See generally Josh Gupta-Kagan, Where the Judiciary Prosecutes in Front of Itself:
Missouri’s Unconstitutional Juvenile Court Structure, 78 Mo L Rev 1245 (2013).
257 See Investigation of the St. Louis County Family Court at *33 (cited in note 19).
258 Supreme Court of Missouri, Re: Rule 14.01 Assignment of Judicial Personnel
¶ 1(b) (Dec 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5ZQE-JZ5B. The amended version of the
Missouri Supreme Court Operating Rules requires the separation of “the appointing authority” for juvenile officers from juvenile judges who hear cases that those juvenile officers file. See Mo S Ct Operating Rule 14.01(b).
259 See Oregon Task Force Final Report at *24 (cited in note 251).
260 See id.
254
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Five states reported some kind of hybrid system.261 (Not every
state responded.) Most of these states reported that attorney general or district attorney office lawyers represented the agency rather than the state. But several states reported that these attorneys had a “dual mandate”—to simultaneously represent the
agency and the state as a whole.262
A review of state statutes reveals divergent statutory structures. Eight states assign child protection agencies the authority
to determine which cases to file (or at least permit anyone to file
cases, including child protection agency staff),263 and those states
give those agencies their own lawyers.264 Twenty-five states
assign child protection agencies the authority to determine which
cases to file, but assign lawyers from other executive-branch
agencies to prosecute child protection cases.265 In such a structure,
261 See id (relaying that 80 percent of jurisdictions surveyed reported that the agency
attorney represents the agency).
262 Id (“[Eight jurisdictions] reported either that the state was the agency (that these
roles could not be bifurcated) or interpreted their state’s authorizing statute for government representation to include a dual mandate.”).
263 See Ariz Rev Stat § 8-841 (permitting anyone, including the agency, to file petition); Ark Code Ann §§ 9-27-310(b)(2), 9-27-311(e)(2)(D); Fla Stat Ann § 39.501(1); Mass
Gen Laws Ann ch 119, § 51B; NH Rev Stat Ann §§ 169-C:8-a, 169-C:18; 23 Pa Cons Stat
Ann § 6370; RI Gen Laws § 40-11-7; SC Code Ann §§ 63-7-920, 63-7-1620(4), 63-7-1660.
264 Some of these states’ statutes specify that child protection agencies have their own
lawyers. See, for example, Fla Stat Ann § 39.501(1); RI Gen Laws § 40-11-14. The other
states listed in note 263 have reported that attorneys represent either state or county
agencies. See Ruiz and Trowbridge, National Survey of Child Welfare Legal Representation Models at 9–10 (cited in note 228).
265 See Alaska Stat Ann § 47.10.020 (authorizing the department to file petitions);
State of Alaska Department of Law, Civil Division (State of Alaska 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/5WPC-3WNW (describing the Civil Division as providing legal services to
the Department of Health and Social Services in child protection cases); Cal Welf & Inst
Code §§ 325, 328; Colo Rev Stat Ann §§ 19-3-206, 19-3-501 (assigning the county attorney
to represent the petitioner, and describing the investigation by the county department of
social services as leading to a request to the court to “[a]uthorize a petition”); Conn Gen
Stat Ann §§ 46b-121b(b), 46b-129(a); 10 Del Code Ann § 1003 (granting anyone, including
agency staff, power to initiate cases); 29 Del Code Ann § 2505(b) (assigning to the attorney
general the responsibility to appoint a state solicitor, who is responsible for cases involving
state agencies); Ga Code Ann § 15-11-150 (granting Division of Family and Children
Services employees or any person with actual knowledge of child abuse power to file petitions); Georgia Department of Human Services, FAQ (State of Georgia), archived at
http://perma.cc/XMJ8-KFPE (identifying special assistant attorneys general as legal representatives in child protection cases); Haw Rev Stat § 571-62 (assigning the attorney general to represent the agency); 705 ILCS Stat §§ 405/1-6, 405/2-13; Iowa Code Ann
§§ 232.87(2), 232.90(2); 22 Me Rev Stat Ann, §§ 4004(2)(F), 4032; 5 Me Rev Stat Ann § 191;
Md Family Law Code Ann § 5-710; Md Ct and Jud Proceedings Code Ann § 3-809; Mich
Comp Laws Ann § 722.638; Minn Stat Ann §§ 260C.141(1), 260C.163(4); NJ Stat Ann
§ 9:6-8.34 (giving the agency, the county prosecutor, and others power to file petitions);
Department of Children and Families Practice Group (DCF) (State of New Jersey, Office
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the agency is sometimes the client and thus has the authority to
determine which cases to file, but representation through another
elected official’s office could put that official’s imprint on intake
decisions. Attorneys employed beyond the agency could further
shape agency decisions when they are charged with representing
the state generally or the public interest rather than the
agency.266 In such cases, case workers will continue their work
throughout a case, but the state’s attorney will not be obliged to
represent only them or their agency’s position. Eleven states and
the District of Columbia give an elected prosecutor or some other
executive-branch lawyer authority to determine which cases to
file.267 In such a model, the agency may still wield significant influence by choosing which cases to refer to the prosecuting attorney and thus practically determining that many cases will not be

of the Attorney General), archived at http://perma.cc/9YNS-VVQJ (explaining that the attorney general represents the New Jersey child protection agency); NY Fam Ct Law
§§ 1032, 1038, 1048 (granting the child protection agency power to file petitions and referencing “corporation counsel, county attorney or district attorney” as lawyers for the
state); Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2151.27 (anyone, including the child protection agency, can
file); Or Rev Stat § 419B.809 (permitting anyone, including the agency, to file petitions);
Oregon Task Force Final Report at *26–27 (cited in note 251); SD Cod Laws §§ 26-7A-9 to
26-7A-10; Tenn Code Ann §§ 37-1-119, 37-1-124 (permitting anyone with direct
knowledge, who will typically be agency staff, to file petitions and assigning district attorneys or county attorneys to represent agency petitioners); Utah Code Ann §§ 62A-4a-113,
78A-6-304; 33 Vt Stat Ann § 5309 (providing that the state’s attorney “shall prepare and
file a petition” upon agency request); Va Code Ann § 16.1-260(A); Wash Rev Code
§§ 13.04.093, 26.44.195; W Va Code §§ 49-4-501, 49-4-601; Wyo Stat Ann § 14-3204(a)(viii). Not every state statute specifies which attorneys represent the agency or
state. California, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming have all reported via survey that executivebranch attorneys outside of their child protection agencies provide representation. See
Ruiz and Trowbridge, National Survey of Child Welfare Legal Representation Models at
9–10 (cited in note 228).
266 See, for example, Iowa Code Ann §§ 232.87(2), 232.90(1)–(2) (granting the agency
authority to file petitions but directing that the county attorney “shall represent the state,”
defined as “the general interest held by the people in the health, safety, welfare, and protection of all children living in this state”); Minn Stat § 260C.163(4) (providing that county
attorneys represent both the agency and “the public interest in the welfare of the child”).
Charging lawyers with representing dual clients—an agency and “the public interest”—
could raise ethical issues when those clients’ goals conflict. A full exploration of those ethical issues is beyond the scope of this Article.
267 See DC Code § 16-2305(c)(1); Idaho Code §§ 16-1610, 16-1631; Kan Stat Ann §§ 382214, 38-2230, 38-2233; Ky Rev Stat Ann §§ 610.030, 620.040 (“For a public offense complaint, the matter shall be referred to the county attorney.”); Mont Code Ann § 41-3-422(2);
Neb Rev Stat § 43-261; Nev Rev Stat § 432B.510(2); NM Stat Ann §§ 32A-1-6, 32A-4-15;
NC Gen Stat Ann §§ 7B-401.1(a), 7B-302, 7B-305, 7B-306; ND Cent Code §§ 27-20-20, 2720-24(3); 10A Okla Stat Ann §§ 1-4-301(A), 1-4-501; Wis Stat § 48.25.
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prosecuted.268 Some states vary by county or judicial circuit.269
Three states give court-employed intake officers authority to initiate cases,270 but in one of those, case law suggests a greater role
for child protection agencies,271 and the other notes a statutory
role for the child protection agency and prosecutor.272 Several
states’ statutes give both the child protection agency and prosecutors simultaneous authority to initiate cases.273
As with juvenile delinquency cases,274 these statutes permit
varying practices. It is likely in many jurisdictions that prosecutors largely follow caseworker recommendations. In others, it is
likely that agency authority is circumvented by bringing cases directly to prosecutors.275 A more precise accounting of practices
across different jurisdictions remains a task for future research.
C.

Pre-Gault Vestiges

Not only do states vary significantly in how their statutes
structure family-court prosecutorial discretion, but vestiges of the
pre-Gault era remain in the law and practice of many states.
Missouri provides the most dramatic example: It has maintained
its system of family-court-employed juvenile officers who determine which child protection and delinquency cases to file. Moreover, Missouri assigns attorneys (who were also employed by the
family court) to those juvenile officers to prosecute cases; no

268

See, for example, Idaho Code § 16-1631.
Texas is the most prominent example. It permits a “governmental entity”—usually
the child protection agency—to file child protection petitions. Tex Fam Code Ann
§ 262.101. In more populated areas, the district or county attorney represents the agency,
while in less populated areas, an agency employee represents the agency. See Ruiz and
Trowbridge, National Survey of Child Welfare Legal Representation Models at 10 (cited in
note 228). See also, for example, Wash Rev Code § 13.04.093 (providing that the attorney
general represents the agency but may contract with county prosecuting attorneys in
smaller counties).
270 See Ala Code Ann § 12-15-120; Miss Code Ann § 43-21-357; Mo Rev Stat
§ 211.081(1).
271 See G.H. v Cleburne County Department of Human Resources, 62 S3d 540, 541,
544 (Ala Civ App 2010) (reporting that the child protection agency “filed petitions,” which
were “endorsed by” the juvenile-court officer).
272 See Miss Code Ann §§ 43-21-357, 43-21-451.
273 See Ind Code §§ 31-37-8-5, 31-37-8-6, 31-34-9-1; La Children’s Code Ann Art 631.
274 See text accompanying notes 244–45.
275 See Gupta-Kagan, 78 Mo L Rev at 1286 (cited in note 256) (describing how individual child abuse and neglect reporters in Missouri may “circumvent” the child protection
agency by referring cases directly to those with authority to file cases).
269
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executive-branch agency or attorney has that role in either delinquency or child protection cases.276
Two other vestiges exist in many more states. First, many
states give anyone the right to initiate family-court proceedings
in child protection cases,277 delinquency cases,278 or both.279 Such
provisions go beyond individuals’ right to report a suspected
crime to the police or suspected abuse or neglect to a child protection agency—it permits individuals to trigger the state’s coercive
authority over other individuals in a public-law case, without a
government official first determining that it serves the public interest to do so. That is even broader than unlimited standing to
bring private child-visitation cases, which the US Supreme Court
has described as “breathtakingly broad.”280 Even if this historical
feature of family courts has faded over time,281 such provisions are
still sometimes used. In 2015, my clinic handled a case in which
a teacher accused a student of an assault. A school resource officer
had investigated, and neither she nor the school principal saw fit
to refer the child to family court. The teacher went ahead and filed
a petition, leading to several court dates—and risking the harms
that come with haling a child into court282—before the prosecutor
agreed to dismiss the case several days before trial.283
Second, many states’ juvenile delinquency intake procedures
continue to feature “court officers.”284 These individuals work for
the same family-court judges who hear petitions; the court
officers are thus placed in the wrong branch of government (the
judiciary rather than the executive branch), and they are not

276 See id at 1245. The DOJ’s report on its investigation into the St. Louis County
family court concluded that these juvenile officers created a “constitutionally flawed family court structure.” See Investigation of the St. Louis County Family Court at *31–34 (cited
in note 19).
277 See, for example, Ark Code Ann § 9-27-310(b)(3)(A); Fla Stat Ann § 39.501(1); 705
ILCS Stat 405/2-13(1); Kan Stat Ann § 38-2233; Ky Rev Stat Ann § 620.070(1); Or Rev
Stat § 419B.809; W Va Code § 49-4-601(a).
278 See, for example, SC Code Ann § 63-19-1020.
279 See, for example, Ala Rule Juv Proc 12(A); 10 Del Code Ann § 1003; Minn Stat
Ann §§ 260B.141(1), 260C.141(1); NH Rev Stat Ann §§ 169-B:6, 169-C:7; Ohio Rev Code
§ 2151.27(A)(1); 23 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 6334(a); RI Gen Laws § 14-1-11(b); Tenn Code
Ann § 37-1-119.
280 Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57, 67 (2000).
281 See Mears, The Front End of Juvenile Court at 575 (cited in note 18).
282 See, for example, note 27 and accompanying text (discussing the association between court appearances and reduced high school graduation).
283 The child in this case became a client of the University of South Carolina Juvenile
Justice Clinic, which I teach, and the Richland County Public Defender.
284 See Mears, The Front End of Juvenile Court at 576–77 (cited in note 18).
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placed alongside an executive-branch agency and thus are not
governed by state administrative law. The continued use of these
court intake officers is troubling for several reasons. First, their
placement in the judicial branch raises separation-of-powers concerns; the independence of both the intake officer’s decision and
the judge’s adjudication can reasonably be questioned when intake officers are employed by the family court.285 Second, separating the intake function from the postadjudication work of juvenile
justice agencies prevents the creation of comprehensive juvenile
justice agencies. The intake officers contributing to intake decisions do not have responsibility for the consequences of those decisions, a topic discussed in more depth in Part IV.B.
D. A Need for Empirical Study
The variety of statutory intake structures suggests the value
of empirical research to investigate whether different intake
structures lead to different results and, if so, what differences
might result. There is currently a dearth of empirical studies exploring the impact of prosecutors’ role in intake decisions or how
that role impacts racial disparities.286 Several colleagues and I are
now comparing delinquency intake decisions in counties in which
elected prosecutors’ offices make all intake decisions with decisions in other counties in the same state287 in which state juvenile
justice agency intake officers make recommendations to elected
prosecutors. Our goal is to determine what effect, if any, such different intake practices have. Similar studies in both delinquency
and child protection cases could empirically establish the importance of intake structures and help policymakers reform or refine existing structures.

285 For a fuller articulation of this argument, see generally Gupta-Kagan, 78 Mo L
Rev 1245 (cited in note 256).
286 See James C. Howell, et al, Bulletin 5: Young Offenders and an Effective Response
in the Juvenile and Adult Justice Systems—What Happens, What Should Happen, and
What We Need to Know *6 (July 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/D98V-KDJN (“[W]e
know very little about how race and ethnicity affect formal charging practices and plea
negotiations.”); Mears, The Front End of Juvenile Court at 576 (cited in note 18).
287 While the state laws surveyed in Part III.A apply throughout a state, practice under such laws may vary within a state. See notes 244–45, 275 and accompanying text. Our
study will control for between-county differences and child-specific differences to isolate
any effects of different intake structures.
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IV. AN AGENCY MODEL FOR FAMILY-COURT PROSECUTORS
Determining who should hold prosecutorial discretion in
child protection and juvenile delinquency cases is an essential
piece of a complete “constitutional domestication” of family
courts.288 This domestication is not complete—vestigial officials
remain in many states, as Part III.C shows. And where domestication has occurred, Parts III.A and III.B show that the field has
not reached a consistent answer as to how to best structure prosecutorial discretion. This Part argues that granting authority to
child protection and juvenile justice agencies is the best means to
structure family-court prosecutorial discretion.
Assigning family-court prosecutors to represent agencies,
and granting those agencies power to exercise prosecutorial
discretion, would help the juvenile justice and child protection
systems operate more consistently with their historical and
statutory purposes. Child protection and delinquency law continue their historical focus on rehabilitation of offenders and
emphasis on keeping children at home with their families.
Agency control would avoid the likelihood that elected prosecutors’ offices—especially in delinquency cases—impose an overly
punitive view on intake decisions, and perhaps reverse the toughon-crime era spike in the proportion of cases prosecuted rather
than dismissed or diverted.289 Both the structure and culture of
elected prosecutors’ offices and those offices’ electoral incentives
to appear tough on crime create tension with rehabilitative goals.
Juvenile justice and child protection agencies have more information about available resources and staff better trained in the
fundamentals of child development, and thus they are better
suited to decide when court intervention is beneficial and when
some alternative course is preferred.
An agency model can also lead to meaningful judicial review
of charging decisions—a core and elusive goal of those studying
criminal prosecutors—and achieve other systemic benefits. Under current law, granting elected prosecutors charging discretion
creates many of the same challenges with prosecutorial authority
discussed in Part I.B. Such judicial review is an important check
on prosecutors’ authority—one that is difficult to impose on criminal cases but can more easily be lodged with family courts that
review the agencies’ exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
288
289

Gault, 387 US at 22.
See text accompanying notes 22–23.

2018]

Rethinking Family-Court Prosecutors

799

Finally, an agency model can help ensure greater democratic
accountability, provide better counseling to these essential agencies, and attain more consistent practice throughout a state.
A.

More Consistent with Statutory Purposes

Family-court prosecutions are essential elements of juvenile
justice and child protection systems that, by statute, emphasize
rehabilitation. As commentators through family-court history
have noted, this emphasis fundamentally differs from the criminal justice system. An agency charged with administering such a
statute is better situated than elected prosecutors to apply such
an emphasis.
1. Different purposes from criminal prosecutions.
Family-court prosecutorial discretion should vary from criminal prosecutorial discretion because family-court cases have fundamentally different purposes. Criminal prosecutions vindicate
the public’s interest in retribution for crimes and the deterrence
of other crimes, while family courts continue to focus more on rehabilitating children and their families. This difference is illustrated in case-naming conventions; while criminal cases are
named as the state versus the defendant, both child protection
and juvenile delinquency cases are captioned “In the matter of” or
“In re” the child.290
Child protection cases have no retributive purposes; the goal
is to protect individual children, rehabilitate children and their
caregivers, prevent the need for removing children even when
parents have abused or neglected them, and reunify children with
parents when they are separated. Federal law requires states to
make efforts to achieve these goals as a condition of receiving federal funds.291
Even in delinquency cases, punishing youth remains a lesser
function when compared to rehabilitation, and, as a result, delinquency intake “contrasts markedly with criminal justice.”292 Deterring youth is a much reduced if not eliminated goal due to developmental psychology that makes it difficult to deter

290 See generally, for example, Gault, 387 US at 1 (delinquency); In re Stanley, 256 NE2d
814 (Ill 1970), revd and remd, Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645 (1972) (child protection).
291 See 42 USC § 671(a)(15)(B).
292 Mears, The Front End of Juvenile Court at 575 (cited in note 18).
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teenagers.293 Much has been written about delinquency law’s shift
away from rehabilitative and toward more punitive purposes
through “tough-on-crime” reforms of the 1980s and 1990s,294 but
the family court has largely retained rehabilitative goals in most
cases it handles, especially for low-level offenses. Most tough-oncrime reforms changed the boundaries of family court—expanding situations in which authorities could waive children to be
tried in adult court and subject to adult penalties—or otherwise
toughened sanctions for relatively serious offenses. Such reforms
do not affect allegations that a child committed a misdemeanor
offense at school or committed any of the other relatively minor
charges that are the most common delinquency charges.295 Regarding those charges, as discussed above,296 juvenile prosecutors
increased the ratio of cases that they prosecuted as compared
with those that were diverted—using prosecutorial discretion to
create significant reform.
Despite this increased likelihood to prosecute rather than divert cases, states’ juvenile justice codes make clear that rehabilitation and accountability must be balanced. State laws describe
children who commit crimes as those “in need of treatment or rehabilitation”297 and describe the purpose of juvenile justice systems as to hold a child “accountable” for crimes, to focus on rehabilitation, and to apply justice based on an understanding of
children’s development and various other social factors.298 Analyzing the purpose clauses of states juvenile codes, the DOJ found
only six states that it categorized as emphasizing public protection and accountability for children over rehabilitation.299 The

293 As the Supreme Court wrote in Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551 (2005), “the same
characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.” Id at 571, cited in Graham v Florida, 560 US
48, 72 (2010), and Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460, 472 (2012).
294 See generally, for example, Feld, 84 Minn L Rev 327 (cited in note 173).
295 For instance, the most frequent charges in South Carolina family-court referrals
in 2013–2014 were (in decreasing order) assault and battery third degree, disturbing
schools, shoplifting, public disorderly conduct, simple possession of marijuana, truancy,
probation violation, and contempt of court. See 2014–2015 Annual Statistical Report at
*13 (cited in note 34).
296 See notes 187–90 and accompanying text.
297 See, for example, SC Code Ann § 63-1-20(B).
298 See, for example, DC Code § 16-2301.02.
299 The six states are Connecticut, Hawaii, North Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming.
See Juvenile Justice System Structure & Process, Organization and Administration of Delinquency Services (OJJDP), archived at http://perma.cc/CPR5-VUNF.
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vast majority emphasized a balance between those goals and rehabilitation—if not a tilt toward the latter.300
If anything, the pendulum is swinging back toward rehabilitation as the juvenile justice system’s central purpose, informed
by a deeper understanding of adolescent development.301 The
Supreme Court’s string of “children are different” cases has defined twenty-first-century juvenile justice reform trends.302
Through five cases, the Court emphasized what adolescent psychology has taught us about teenagers’ mental and emotional development. That children differ significantly from adults, and
that legal rules applied to children must therefore differ, is now a
“commonsense reality.”303 In particular, children are less culpable
than adults, less likely to be deterred, and more likely to be rehabilitated.304 While the Court’s discussion was in the context of
Eighth Amendment cases challenging the most severe criminal
sentences imposed on children convicted of the most serious
crimes, there is no logical principle that distinguishes minor offenses in family court. And policy reforms consistent with the
Supreme Court’s “children are different” cases have covered minor offenses. For instance, states have expanded family-court jurisdiction in recent years, primarily by raising the maximum age
at which a child can be tried in family court.305

300 See id. The National Juvenile Defender Center reached the same conclusion and
provided statutory excerpts. National Juvenile Defender Center, Comparative & Multijurisdiction Data: Juvenile Justice Purpose Clauses—Multi-jurisdiction Survey (Jan
2014), online at http://njdc.info/practice-policy-resources/state-profiles/multi-jurisdiction
-data/ (visited Dec 27, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
301 See, for example, Sayali Himanshu Bapat and Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Is
There Justice for Juveniles in the United States, India, and Italy?: Towards a Framework
for Transnational Comparisons, in Tamar R. Birckhead and Solange Mouthaan, eds, The
Future of Juvenile Justice: Procedure and Practice from a Comparative Perspective 37, 45–
46 (Carolina 2016).
302 The “children are different” quote comes from Miller, 567 US at 480. The other
cases are Roper, 543 US 551; Graham, 560 US 48; J.D.B. v North Carolina, 564 US 261
(2011); and Montgomery v Louisiana, 136 S Ct 718 (2016).
303 See J.D.B., 564 US at 265. J.D.B. made a point to emphasize that the law has long
treated children differently, that these differences apply across a wide range of legal areas,
and that such differences are a “settled understanding.” Id at 262.
304 See, for example, Miller, 567 US at 571.
305 This trend is illustrated at Jurisdictional Boundaries (Juvenile Justice GPS),
online at http://www.jjgps.org/jurisdictional-boundaries (visited Nov 13, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable). This website excludes two states that recently expanded family-court
jurisdiction. See SB 324, 2016 La Sess Law Serv 521, codified at La Children’s Code
Art 804(1); Act No 268 § 2, 2016 SC Acts & Resol 1751, 1752–53 (including a statutory
provision to take effect, per § 12, in 2019).
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A related difference between adult criminal court and familycourt delinquency and child protection cases are that the latter
are confidential while criminal cases explicitly seek to blame
criminals publicly as one tool to punish, shame, and deter crime.
While juvenile delinquency proceedings are less confidential than
they used to be,306 they are still generally closed proceedings,307
and juveniles’ names are still mostly shielded from public view.
Confidentiality’s historical purpose has been to promote the family court’s rehabilitative purposes and to shield children and families from the stigma of public disclosure,308 a purpose Gault explicitly recognized.309
2. Elected prosecutors’ offices are not structured to apply a
rehabilitative statute.
For a child who is repeatedly unruly, when is a school intervention, the provision of services from other agencies, or a diversion program more effective than prosecution in court? For parents who abuse substances and are abused by a partner and
neglect their children as a result, when is court intervention necessary and when can less invasive steps work? There is little inherent in an elected prosecutor’s role or training that helps answer these questions. Worse, granting this power to elected
prosecutors can undermine the juvenile justice and child protection law’s rehabilitative purposes.
Locating charging decisions in elected prosecutors’ offices
likely leads to the overvaluation of punitive or deterrence goals
and the subordination of rehabilitative goals in both delinquency
and child protection systems, though it arises more frequently in
the juvenile delinquency context. There, the status quo’s empowerment of elected prosecutors’ offices—and disempowerment of
juvenile justice agencies—threatens what Justice White called

306 Many have criticized policy reforms that have edged away from confidentiality. See generally, for example, Kristin Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in
Delinquency Proceedings: Should Schools and Public Housing Authorities Be
Notified?, 79 NYU L Rev 520 (2004).
307 See id at 536 (noting that, while increasing exceptions exist, “almost every state
still has some statutory provision for the confidentiality of juvenile hearings and records”);
Henning, 98 Cornell L Rev at 394 (cited in note 10) (noting that most juvenile delinquency
cases remain closed, with exceptions often limited to more serious charges).
308 See Henning, 79 NYU L Rev at 527–30 (cited in note 306).
309 See Gault, 387 US at 25. Gault did recognize that delinquency adjudications stigmatize youth, id at 22–24, and child protection cases similarly stigmatize families, but
that stigma is a consequence, not a purpose of family-court cases.
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the juvenile system’s unique ability to check “overzealous prosecutor[s].”310 White wrote in an era before prosecutors gained
charging authority—and his concern is particularly strong now
that they have largely done so.
Elected prosecutors generally work to prosecute and convict
individuals for criminal offenses. The National District Attorneys
Association described elected prosecutors’ “primary responsibility” as serving as “an independent administrator of justice”—focusing on “accountab[ility]” for the guilty and “protect[ion]” for
the innocent.311 Their guidelines for juvenile prosecutors’ charging
decisions differ only modestly from adult guidelines.312 The guidelines acknowledge the value of “the special interests and needs of
the juvenile,” but make clear that juvenile prosecutors’ “primary
duty . . . is to seek justice,” and rehabilitating children exists only
as a secondary goal, and only so long as it does not “unduly compromise[e]” their primary duty.313
Prosecutors’ close relationships with police departments often furthers this punitive orientation. Police officers are trained
to investigate and enforce the law; they are not trained to determine which children can be served through school interventions
and which through juvenile justice interventions. Several studies
have documented in the child protection context that “police have
a more punitive attitude” than other categories of professionals.314
Vesting control in elected prosecutors risks overreliance on the
views of law enforcement officers in charging decisions, and too
little reliance on individuals with a statutorily mandated rehabilitation orientation.

310

See text accompanying note 94.
National District Attorneys Association, National Prosecution Standards 1-1.1 at
*2 (3d ed 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/MZ4S-RHPD.
312 See Henning, 98 Cornell L Rev at 438 (cited in note 10).
313 See National Prosecution Standards 4-11.1 at *64 (cited in note 311). See also id
4-11.8 at *65 (“[T]he primary concern of the prosecutor should be protection of the public
interest.”); id 4-11.10 at *66 (providing that disposition recommendations should serve
children’s needs only to the extent that “they are consistent with community safety and
welfare”).
314 Theodore P. Cross, David Finkelhor, and Richard Ormrod, Police Involvement in
Child Protective Services Investigations: Literature Review and Secondary Data Analysis,
10 Child Maltreatment 224, 231 (2005) (discussing prior studies). Professors Theodore P.
Cross, David Finkelhor, and Richard Ormrod largely studied police involvement in child
protection investigations rather than their less frequent involvement in deciding whether
to remove children. See id at 237 (reporting rates of police involvement in investigation
and the “[p]lan/placement decision”).
311
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Some elected prosecutors’ offices further that punitive orientation through various management practices. Some offices determine promotions and salaries in part based on the convictions
won by line prosecutors—leaving little career benefit for an individual prosecutor who declines to prosecute children for petty offenses that could be addressed through means other than the
family court.315 Some prosecutors who espoused a less punitive
approach to their jobs have expressed concern that such views
would impair their career trajectories.316 Some offices use the
number of dismissals as a means to measure attorneys’ performance317—a measure that discourages dismissals, even when supported by a reasoned conclusion that diversion would better rehabilitate the child than prosecution. Such measures are
particularly inappropriate in states in which any individual can
make referrals318 because the different pool of referrals may have
a different proportion of meritorious cases than the adult criminal
system. Many offices lack attorneys devoted to juvenile cases, instead filling these positions with new attorneys seeking promotion to an adult criminal docket319—which they earn through high
conviction numbers rather than exercising charging discretion.320
In addition to different office cultures, prosecutors are not
professionally trained to analyze the various social factors that
should drive family-court charging decisions. Determining
whether prosecution is warranted in any given case requires identification of the root causes of concerning behavior and evaluation
of alternative interventions, a determination that benefits from a
strong understanding of adolescent development, mental health

315 See Henning, 98 Cornell L Rev at 434 (cited in note 10); Bishop and Frazier, 5
Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at 301 (cited in note 63) (“All too frequently juvenile
divisions are places of first assignment for newly hired assistant state attorneys who eventually move on to the more prestigious criminal divisions.”).
316 See Bishop and Frazier, 5 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at 298 n 51 (cited in
note 63).
317 See, for example, National District Attorneys Association, American Prosecutors
Research Institute, Performance Measures for Prosecutors, Findings from the Application
of Performance Measures in Two Prosecutors’ Offices *2 (2007), archived at
http://perma.cc/D3MP-Z9PR. This report called for further study of measurements related
to dismissals, such as the ratio of convictions to cases charged. Id at *14.
318 See text accompanying notes 277–79.
319 This practice is disfavored by the National District Attorneys Association. See
National Prosecution Standards 4-11.3 at *64 (cited in note 311).
320 See Anna VanCleave, Brady and the Juvenile Courts, 38 NYU Rev L & Soc Change
551, 557 (2014).
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conditions,321 and family functioning. Assessing such factors is
“far more fitting for a probation officer than for prosecutor inquiry.”322 Some prosecutors have acknowledged that they are “ill
prepared” for the task of determining which teenagers require
prosecution, which may need diversion, and which require no
court intervention at all.323 These points are even more true in
child protection cases, in which determining which cases to prosecute requires distinguishing children who are so in danger that
they require removal from children whose families can safely care
for them with some less coercive intervention, and attorneys lack
training in the relevant principles of child development or family
dynamics.324
Locating prosecutorial discretion with agencies provides contrasts on all points. Agency attorneys are “likely to be committed
to the agency’s particular substantive mission,”325 which prominently features rehabilitation. Juvenile justice agencies are more
likely to be focused on rehabilitation. A juvenile justice agency
lawyer’s career should not depend on a simple win–loss record or
number of cases filed or dismissed. For agencies, success (and
therefore good lawyering and a lawyer’s promotion) should look
different. Professors Neal Devins and Michael Herz suggest that
success for a lawyer representing an agency should be measured
by success of the agency’s overall mission and any relevant policy
agenda.326 Defining precise metrics for juvenile justice and child
protection agency lawyers is beyond the scope of this Article. It
suffices to point out that such metrics should include measures,
such as recidivism rates of individual defendants (both among
children diverted and prosecuted), that are central to agencies’
rehabilitative missions.
321 For example, one recent study found that the prosecution of first-time offenders is
associated with higher rates of reoffending, except for children “diagnosed with an
aggression-related mental disorder.” See Barrett and Katsiyannis, 26 J Child & Fam Stud
at 2051–52 (cited in note 26).
322 Rubin, 26 Crime & Delinq at 304 (cited in note 84).
323 Reich, 14 Gonzaga L Rev at 349 (cited in note 167).
324 See Herring, 24 U Toledo L Rev at 624 (cited in note 213). See also Brooke N.
Silverthorn, Agency Representation in Child Welfare Proceedings, in Donald N. Duquette,
Ann M. Haralambie, and Vivek S. Sankaran, eds, Child Welfare Law and Practice:
Representing Children, Parents, and State Agencies in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency
Cases 751, 754 (National Association of Counsel for Children 3d ed 2016) (cautioning that
prosecutors “with little or no training or specialized knowledge in child welfare” should
not make decisions about which children to remove or cases to file).
325 Michael Herz, The Attorney Particular: Governmental Role of the Agency General
Counsel, in Clayton, ed, Government Lawyers 143, 143 (cited in note 71).
326 Devins and Herz, 5 U Pa J Const L at 588 (cited in note 67).
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B.

Structured to Coordinate Intake Decisions and Systemic
Goals

Administrative agencies perform essential work in the child
protection and juvenile justice systems, and are best situated to
consider legal and nonlegal factors to determine if a court case
serves particular children’s interests. Most importantly, agencies
have the capacity to connect intake decisions with services available for particular children and families and thus are best situated to apply the system’s goals in a coherent and pragmatic
manner.
Relatedly, an agency model aligns the costs of bringing a
case—supervising a child on probation or taking care of a child
committed to a child protection or juvenile justice agency’s
custody—with the authority to initiate these cases. Professor
John Pfaff has argued that the ability of elected criminal prosecutors to send individuals to prison without paying the costs of
housing prisoners creates problems with prosecutors’ decisions in
the criminal justice system, and he recommends making elected
prosecutors pay some of those costs.327 Because child protection
and juvenile justice agencies have such large roles in family-court
cases—comparatively larger than departments of correction—
assigning them intake authority represents a simpler reform
than Pfaff’s proposal to split costs between prosecutors and prison
agencies.
1. Child protection agencies.
Child protection agencies should exercise prosecutorial discretion because they have comparatively greater ability to determine which children and families would most benefit from court
involvement. Modern child protection agencies operate comprehensive systems. They manage child protection hotlines and determine which reports of child maltreatment can lead immediately to provision of services on a voluntary basis (known as
differential response) and which need investigation. These agencies’ investigations substantiate some allegations of maltreatment, and then these agencies determine which families with
such substantiations would benefit from voluntary services and
which need court involvement. The child protection agencies
themselves also operate foster care systems—so they know what

327

Pfaff, Locked In at 142–43, 213–14 (cited in note 58).
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placements and services are available if they seek a court order
transferring custody to them. They thus have a unique ability to
determine which cases would most benefit from court intervention—and which families the agency is not likely able to help.
An agency’s specialized knowledge of its own services reflects
one purpose of separation of powers articulated by the Supreme
Court in Heckler v Chaney,328 especially when litigation is one tool
in a complicated regulatory system:
[A]n agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly
within its expertise. Thus, the agency must not only assess
whether a violation has occurred, but whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether
the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all.329
Applying the Heckler principle to child protection cases is
straightforward. State child protection agencies operate comprehensive child protection systems and are in the best position to
determine “whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another,” and whether a family-court prosecution or
some other agency action is most effective. Prosecutors working
in such agencies must soon learn how to help counsel their agency
clients to balance their competing goals and make intake decisions consistent with their policy priorities.
2. Juvenile justice agencies.
Similar arguments support granting juvenile justice agencies
charging authority and assigning family-court prosecutors to represent them. Juvenile justice agencies have a strong understanding of child development. Agencies employ social workers and psychologists, whose professional training includes adolescent
development. These agencies are thus more likely to follow developmental psychology that suggests that some petty misbehavior
does not require rehabilitative services at all—if it is normal teenage behavior—or requires some intervention other than coercive
328

470 US 821 (1985).
Id at 831. Heckler involved an effort to force the Food and Drug Administration to
regulate drugs used by states in lethal injections. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld
the agency’s ability to decline to regulate those drugs. Id at 837–38.
329
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court-imposed services. Professor Henning has compellingly
called on prosecutors to “collaborate with developmental experts
and community representatives to draft intake and charging
standards” that can provide a check on implicit bias and resulting
racial disparities and “are informed by research in adolescent development.”330 The DOJ has recommended applying trauma
screens during juvenile delinquency intake to identify children
whose offenses may result from a trauma disorder.331 Performing
these interdisciplinary functions within an agency charged with
understanding and following the state of the field knowledge in
adolescent development will help socialize prosecutors to balance
all of the agency’s competing goals. That would contrast positively
with many elected prosecutors’ offices that, as discussed above,
are institutionally primed to give disproportionate consideration
to factors weighing in favor of prosecution and are not generally
trained in relevant social science knowledge.
An agency model must overcome two obstacles unique to juvenile justice law. First, most states lack a comprehensive agency
to handle juvenile justice cases from charging decisions through
postdisposition sentences. Some states, such as South Carolina,
grant their departments a specific role during intake.332 In most
states, however, they are juvenile probation staffers who are not
affiliated with the agency that would take custody of children after an adjudication.333 As discussed in Part III.A, many states
maintain a role for probation or intake officers, including those
employed in the judicial branch. These pre-Gault relics often take
on roles in juvenile delinquency cases that have largely been
assigned to child protection agencies.
This split between intake departments and postadjudication
service agencies makes little sense, and those functions should be
merged into a more comprehensive juvenile justice agency. Comprehensive juvenile justice agencies would likely bring a more
balanced perspective to charging decisions and thus better fulfill
the juvenile justice system’s purposes. Those agencies are
charged with providing rehabilitative services to children who are
adjudicated delinquent, and so have a unique ability to determine
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Henning, 98 Cornell L Rev at 387, 457 (cited in note 10).
See Robert L. Listenbee Jr, et al, Report of the Attorney General’s National Task
Force on Children Exposed to Violence *176–77 (OJJDP, 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/LP45-JM99.
332 See SC Code Ann § 63-19-1010.
333 See, for example, 10A Okla Stat Ann § 2-2-104.
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which children are most in need of such services and which children are better served by other entities.
Such unified juvenile justice agencies would finally correct
the historical treatment of family courts as judicial-branch agencies. Early family courts sought to provide services to juvenile
delinquents—consistent with the court’s assumption of executivebranch charging authority, the court assumed executive-branch
authority to provide services to children under its jurisdiction.334
A sociologist studying the family court in the mid-1960s (before
Gault) described it as an administrative agency whose role was
shifting to become a more traditional court.335 Others described
the family court’s intake function as “[r]eflecting the sociolegal
character of the court” and as a mix of “case screening and acceptance procedures of welfare agencies” and adult-criminalcourt charging procedures.336 By the time of Gault, however, observers recognized that the job of providing services had shifted
away from courts to growing executive-branch agencies, such as
juvenile justice, mental health, and child welfare agencies.337 Soon
after Gault, authorities advocated for more formally placing such
authority in the executive branch. In 1979, the ABA recommended shifting all juvenile delinquency intake efforts to the executive branch, in part to locate intake decisions in the same
branch of government that was providing services.338 The ABA
recognized that judges were not well suited to administer social
services339 and that concentrating these services in the executive
branch would improve the variety and coordination of services offered.340 Moreover, judges should be independent of the agencies—
especially when those agencies must comply with judges’ orders

334

See Sheridan, Standards for Juvenile and Family Courts at 9–10 (cited in note 14).
See Lemert, 1967 Wis L Rev at 423 (cited in note 116).
336 Rosenheim and Skoler, 11 Crime & Delinq at 168–69 (cited in note 91).
337 See, for example, Robert D. Vinter, The Constitutional Responsibilities of CourtRelated Personnel, in Virginia Davis Nordin, ed, GAULT: What Now for the Juvenile Court
119, 122 (Institute of Continuing Legal Education 1968) (“There has been an expansion of
welfare service programs apart from the court . . . . Except in certain states the court is no
longer a major source of public services available to youth in trouble.”); Robert D. Vinter,
The Juvenile Court as an Institution, in Task Force Report 84, 84–85 (cited in note 86)
(noting the family court’s dependence on various local agencies and organizations);
Sheridan, Standards for Juvenile and Family Courts at 11 (cited in note 14) (recommending against court administration of social services for children).
338 See Standards Relating to Court Organization and Administration at 15 (cited in
note 148).
339 See id at 15. The ABA approved the standards in 1979. Id at v.
340 Id at 1, 16–17.
335
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about services provided to children.341 Subsequently, state departments of juvenile justice were responsible for children’s cases
postdisposition, but intake services followed a different path, often remaining in the judicial branch while much authority shifted
to local prosecutors’ offices.
Intake and postadjudication services should be unified in one
agency. Intake decisions require determining which children are
most appropriate for the specific rehabilitative services offered by
juvenile justice agencies and which can be served through other
programs. As Heckler suggested, answering that question as accurately as possible should involve considering the full range of
interventions available, and whether charging specific children
would lead to an efficient allocation of scarce agency resources.
Unified juvenile justice agencies would be the entities best suited
to determine whether a child’s case should be dismissed, referred
to a diversion program (which the agency may operate, directly or
through a contractor), or prosecuted (and thus subject to an
agency placement or agency probation supervision if convicted).
A second challenge is that police departments, and not juvenile justice agencies, investigate children suspected of committing
crimes and refer suspects to the juvenile justice system—in contrast to child protection agencies, which investigate child abuse
and neglect allegations. Still, this difference does not justify denying prosecutorial discretion to juvenile justice agencies. The purposes of family-court prosecutions remain focused on rehabilitation. So long as that is true, the agency providing rehabilitation
services is best positioned to determine which cases to file.
3. Elected prosecutors’ control risks inhibiting agency
coordination.
Elected prosecutors’ authority over charging decisions can
harm juvenile justice and child protection agencies’ ability to provide rehabilitative services effectively. Granting prosecutorial
discretion to elected prosecutors, or even to judicial-branch intake
officers, gives those entities control over how many children departments of juvenile justice must serve after adjudication. Those
agencies do not control their “front door,”342 which could lead to
overcrowded juvenile facilities and probation dockets. An agency
that has reached its capacity for effective services to children in
341
342

Id at 15–16.
Alexander S. v Boyd, 876 F Supp 773, 781–82 (D SC 1995).
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custody or on probation cannot adjust intake decisions accordingly; they must take whatever children are ordered into their
custody or supervision. The result can be overcrowded juvenile
facilities or overburdened foster care systems, and their many
correlated problems.343 Depriving agencies of charging authority
empowers others to effectively make policy decisions about the
allocation of agency resources.344 That is precisely what occurs
when nonagency attorneys decide to prosecute a child protection
or delinquency case without bearing responsibility for the consequences in terms of agency resources.
4. Agency interests will more likely coincide with statutory
mandates.
One risk in giving agencies control over which cases to prosecute is that they may make decisions based on their own
interests—trying to shift cases for which they should take responsibility onto other agencies or prosecuting cases as a means to use
(and not lose) available resources. While both concerns are legitimate, the incentives created by an agency model would correct
problems in the existing system. An agency that would be responsible for a child adjudicated delinquent can push back against efforts by other agencies to lead to an adjudication. And legislative
decisions on resource allocation to particular agencies would be
tied to agency decisions about when to use them.
Agencies may attempt to pin responsibility for responding to
particular cases on other agencies, and thus they would allow
some children and families to escape warranted interventions. A
juvenile justice agency, for instance, might decline to prosecute a
child by insisting that a mental health agency or school provide
some sort of intervention first. While such action in individual
cases will surely sometimes be inappropriate, empowering a juvenile justice agency to engage in such efforts will pressure other
agencies to more effectively assist such children. Indeed, there is
a striking inequity under present law—schools, as well as mental
health (and other) agencies, can disclaim responsibility for difficult teenagers and ask elected prosecutors to seek delinquency
343 Indeed, the Alexander S. reference to the South Carolina Department of Juvenile
Justice not controlling its front door explained that the Department of Juvenile Justice
was not entirely at fault for the gross overcrowding and related troubles documented in
that case. Id.
344 See Devins, Toward an Understanding of Legal Policy-Making at Independent
Agencies at 185 (cited in note 71).
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charges. Research into the school-to-prison pipeline has identified
this phenomenon.345 If juvenile justice agencies are not included
in the prosecutors’ decisions, or have only a weak voice in those
decisions, they cannot effectively argue that schools or other
agencies should do more before invoking the juvenile justice system. The juvenile justice system thus becomes too easy of a system to enter—and erodes the family court’s historical place as “an
agency of last resort” for children whose behavior cannot be managed elsewhere.346 As Judge David Bazelon wrote regarding status offenders a generation ago, “[B]ecause you [family courts]
act, no one else does. Schools and public agencies refer their
problem cases to you because you have jurisdiction, because you
exercise it, and because you hold out promises that you can provide solutions.”347
The flip side of this concern is that if an agency has a budget
for a particular amount of services—such as placements in group
homes for foster or delinquent children—it may feel pressured to
prosecute enough cases to utilize all of those services lest the
agency lose budget allocations for such services. Such concerns
are relatively unlikely to play out in practice, at least so long as
child protection and juvenile justice agencies face meager budget
allocations. More broadly, the resource constraints imposed on
agency decisionmaking come with important benefits. These considerations force agencies to prioritize cases for available resources, consistent with Heckler, and thus the legislature’s
budget allocations can be treated as judgments about the scope of
necessary intervention. It is better for agencies to exercise prosecutorial discretion in explicit consideration of those judgments
than for elected prosecutors to do so at a significant distance from
those budgetary realities.
C.

More Effective Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion

A primary benefit of administrative exercise of prosecutorial
discretion is that agency decisions can be subject to some forms of

345 For instance, an ABA report on the school-to-prison pipeline outlines pervasive
beliefs that many children will not succeed in school and details a series of discretionary
decisions that build from academic failures to school discipline to juvenile justice system
involvement. See Redfield and Nance, School-to-Prison Pipeline Preliminary Report at
*18–22 (cited in note 29).
346 Lemert, The Juvenile Court—Quest and Realities at 96 (cited in note 86).
347 David L. Bazelon, Beyond Control of the Juvenile Court, 21 Juv Ct Judges J
42, 44 (1970).
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judicial review. Some commentators have called recently for
judges, rather than prosecutors, to have power to determine
which cases to prosecute and which to divert, but without explaining why a return to judicial control is best or identifying a legal
structure for judges to make such decisions.348 This Section spells
out how an agency model can support a clearer structure for judicial review of charging decisions. Such review would be generally
deferential yet more meaningful than the limited tools available
to check the discretion of elected prosecutors.
1. Arbitrary-and-capricious review of an agency decision to
charge rather than divert.
Prosecutorial discretion should not be boundless. Criminal
justice reform efforts have struggled to identify meaningful
checks on prosecutorial discretion, a difficulty that has largely extended into family court, because the law is extremely hesitant to
question the charging decisions of elected criminal prosecutors.349
Scholars have called for judicial review of criminal prosecutors’
decisions for generations,350 and some describe it as an “ideal” reform idea that has nonetheless failed to gain traction in criminal
court.351 Family court, however, should be different. If familycourt prosecutors represent agencies charged with multiple goals,
including both public safety and rehabilitation of children who
have committed crimes and parents who have abused or neglected
their children, judicial review could ensure some consideration of
those goals.
The basic administrative structure would begin with a child
protection or juvenile justice agency promulgating standards for
intake decisions. At least three states and the District of
Columbia have already done so for delinquency cases by statute
or court rule.352 These factors include various details about the
child’s alleged offense—whether it includes violence or a weapon
348 David R. Katner, Delinquency, Due Process, and Mental Health: Presuming Youth
Incompetency, in Nancy E. Dowd, ed, A New Juvenile Justice System: Total Reform for a
Broken System 104, 117 (NYU 2015).
349 See Barkow, 61 Stan L Rev at 869, 874–87 (cited in note 58).
350 See, for example, Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary
Inquiry 207–14 (LSU 1969).
351 See Barkow, 61 Stan L Rev at 908 (cited in note 58).
352 See DC Code § 16-2305.02(c) (listing factors to consider); Cal Ct Rule 5.516 (same);
Neb Rev Stat § 43-276(1) (same); NH Rev Stat Ann § 169-B:10 (requiring delinquency petitions to “identify why diversion was not an appropriate disposition prior to seeking court
involvement,” but not providing standards for rejecting diversion).
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and “the ages and circumstances of any others involved in the
offense”—and whether the child has committed any prior offenses.353 More severe charges and allegations that a child is a repeat offender should increase the likelihood of prosecution. Similar factors should apply in child protection cases—agencies
should more frequently prosecute cases involving more severe
and repeated instances of abuse or neglect, and cases that present
immediate safety risks to children. Agencies could also use risk
assessments to identify children who pose particularly high risks
of future offenses or who are at particularly high risk of harm if
left at home, although a full examination of the benefits and risks
of such tools is beyond the scope of this Article.354
Agencies should also consider specific factors relating to
whether prosecuting a particular child or parent serves family
courts’ purposes. In juvenile delinquency cases, agencies should
consider a child’s family circumstances, any mental health or substance abuse history related to the alleged offense, and any disabilities that would trigger special education protections related to
the alleged offense355—and whether other agencies have provided
appropriate services for such needs. For instance, if a child’s mental health condition or other disability leads to behavior at school
that is the root of a delinquency charge, then the agency should
consider if the school has provided appropriate special education
services, and whether the child has had an opportunity to access
mental health services. Negative answers weigh in favor of dismissing or diverting such charges. Analogous standards should

353

Neb Rev Stat § 43-276(1)(b), (d), (l). See also, for example, DC Code § 16-2305.02(c)(2).
For instance, Professor Edward P. Mulvey and Anne-Marie R. Iselin report that
actuarial risk assessments more accurately predict risk of future crimes than clinical
methods but that such tools are also designed to overidentify risks, requiring “structured
clinical judgment” to screen out those false positives. Edward P. Mulvey and Anne-Marie
R. Iselin, Improving Professional Judgments of Risk and Amenability in Juvenile Justice,
18 Future of Children 35, 40–41 (Fall 2008). See also Christopher E. Church and Amanda
J. Fairchild, In Search of a Silver Bullet: Child Welfare’s Embrace of Predictive Analytics,
68 Juv & Fam Ct J 67, 68 (Mar 2017) (discussing how “[predictive analytics] have the
capacity to use data to help professionals make decisions more accurately, objectively and
quickly,” but recognizing concerns about “discriminatory practices or consequences”).
Skeptics have criticized how specific agencies have crafted risk assessments in a manner
that validates existing practices. See Marsha Garrison, Taking the Risks out of Child Protection Risk Analysis, 21 J L & Pol 5, 26–27 (2012). See also Tamar R. Birckhead, The
Racialization of Juvenile Justice and the Role of the Defense Attorney, 58 BC L Rev 379,
416–18 (2017) (summarizing the debate over risk assessments in juvenile and criminal
justice).
355 See Willis, 2016 BYU Educ & L J at 202–07 (cited in note 62).
354
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apply in child protection cases—if a parent’s mental health condition leads to abuse or neglect, agencies should consider whether
offering such services to the parent without going to court could
adequately rehabilitate the parent and protect the child. In both
delinquency and child protection cases, agencies should also consider the likelihood that a child or parent will participate in rehabilitative services without a court order.356 Agencies may also consider standards that distinguish different populations or types of
child maltreatment or delinquency. In child protection law, for instance, Professor Michael Wald has discussed different standards
for when removal and court action are required, distinguishing
very young children at risk of significant harm from cases of family conflict involving older children.357 In delinquency, agencies
could analogously treat twelve-year-olds (relatively young for the
delinquency system) differently from seventeen-year-olds, as well
as differentiate among children committing property, drug, or
other offenses.
Applying such standards in individual cases, agency staff and
attorneys would determine whether particular cases are (a) legally sufficient and (b) worth filing because, under those agency
standards, court intervention rather than another step serves the
mix of rehabilitative and other goals of child protection and juvenile justice law. Establishing such clear standards would itself
provide a significant benefit by reducing some of the wide discretion that would otherwise exist358 and by eliminating practices
that, for instance, automatically prosecute felony charges without
considering legal sufficiency or other rehabilitative options.359
Litigants in an ensuing case could seek dismissal of the case
if the agency arbitrarily and capriciously applied its standards.
Such review would provide significant deference to the agency’s
charging decision while still helping to ensure that agencies are
actually reviewing each case and considering all appropriate factors. An agency failing to consider specified standards adequately
should justify dismissal. Consider two examples: In juvenile justice, a particularly important example involves school-based offenses committed by children with disabilities; when provision of
special education services—either any services when schools have
356

See, for example, DC Code § 16-2305.02(c)(4).
See Michael S. Wald, New Directions for Foster Care Reform, 68 Juv & Fam Ct J
7, 25–28 (Mar 2017).
358 See Birckhead, 46 Tex Tech L Rev at 181–83 (cited in note 19).
359 See id at 183 (describing such an automatic prosecution policy).
357
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failed to provide any360 or improved services when schools have
failed to provide adequate services361—is at issue, defendants
should be able to request the opportunity to address their disability at school rather than in court by showing that the administrative agency failed to consider fully whether court intervention
was necessary. In child protection, a common phenomenon involves authorities significantly increasing their removal and
charging rates in response to a tragedy.362 If an agency did so
without sufficiently considering alternatives to removal, then
children’s and parents’ attorneys could seek dismissal of the resulting petitions.
Several jurisdictions have partial models for this type of review. In Washington state, when an intake officer determines
that a child otherwise eligible for diversion should be prosecuted,
it must provide a “detailed statement of its reasons.”363 Washington
cases have recognized a child defendant’s right to ensure that this
decisionmaking is not arbitrary or capricious.364 A small number
of other jurisdictions have explicitly permitted children to file motions to “dismiss for social reasons”—that is, move to dismiss a
case not because the government’s allegations are false, but because court intervention is not necessary to achieve the family
court’s rehabilitative goal.365 The language of these motions harkens back to the family court’s historical oversight of charging discretion, asking the judge to overrule a subordinate’s decision to
prosecute rather than divert a child’s case. Other states permit family courts to dismiss cases at their own discretion but do not provide
a meaningful standard for such review.366 Arbitrary-and-capricious
review brings such review into the modern era by placing it
360 Public schools have a legal obligation to identify all children with disabilities—
known as “child find”—and provide appropriate special education services. 20 USC
§ 1412(a)(3). If a child commits a crime that is a manifestation of a disability, it is reasonable to consider whether remedying any child-find violation, rather than a family-court
prosecution, is the best way to prevent a repeat offense. Willis, 2016 BYU Educ & L J at
202–03 (cited in note 62).
361 Public schools have a legal obligation to provide a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) to children with disabilities. 20 USC § 1412(a)(1). As with child-find violations, charging decisions should consider whether remedying a FAPE violation or prosecution is most appropriate.
362 See text accompanying note 11.
363 Wash Rev Code § 13.40.080(13).
364 See, for example, State v Chatham, 624 P2d 1180, 1182 (Wash App 1981).
365 See DC Super Ct Rule Juv Proceedings 47-I(d); NH Rev Stat Ann § 169-B:10 (authorizing the family court to, sua sponte or on a party’s motion, refer children to diversion
programs); NY Fam Ct Law § 315.2 (motion to dismiss in furtherance of justice).
366 See, for example, SC Code Ann § 63-19-1410(A)(7).
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within familiar administrative-law principles and supplying
more meaningful standards for determining when cases ought to
be dismissed.
2. Judicial review as a tool to check racial and other
disparities.
A judicial check can help reduce the racial, gender, and other
disparities that research has consistently documented in intake
decisions. Previous research has found that intake officers asked
girls more frequently than boys about past abuse or neglect, and
that intake officers noted the “physical appearance, maturity, and
sexuality of girls” with more frequency than with boys.367 Studies
have reached similar findings regarding race at intake. Nationally, black children referred to family courts are less likely to be
diverted and more likely to be charged than white children,368 and
these disparities have existed for years.369 Multiple studies have
found that legal differences—like more severe offenses or a longer
record of prior offenses—cannot fully explain these disparities,
leading to the inference that authorities treat children differently
based on their race.370 A recent study of one state’s intake data
concluded that “being Black significantly increased the odds of
receiving a referral at intake by 54%.”371 Older studies showed

367 Kimberly Kempf-Leonard, The Conundrum of Girls and Juvenile Justice
Processing, in Bishop and Feld, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Juvenile Crime and Juvenile
Justice 485, 496 (cited in note 18).
368 See Investigation of the St. Louis County Family Court at *40 (cited in note 19)
(showing a relative rate index of 0.7 for diversion—meaning that seven black children are
diverted for every ten white children—and 1.2 for charging—meaning that twelve black
children are prosecuted for every ten white children). See also C. Puzzanchera and S.
Hockenberry, National Disproportionate Minority Contact Databook (OJJDP, 2017),
online at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/dmcdb/asp/display.asp?year=2014&offense=1&
display_in=1&displaytype=counts (visited Nov 13, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (reporting that 31.9 out of 100 referred cases were diverted for white youth, while 23.0 out of
100 referred cases were diverted for minority youth in 2014).
369 See Puzzanchera and Hockenberry, National Disproportionate Minority Contact
Databook (cited in note 368) (finding similar gaps for every year reported, from 1990 to 2013).
370 See Bishop and Leiber, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Delinquency and Justice
System Reponses at 463 (cited in note 39).
371 Jennifer H. Peck and Wesley G. Jennings, A Criminal Examination of “Being
Black” in the Juvenile Justice System, 40 L & Hum Behav 219, 226 (2016). These findings
are particularly noteworthy because the authors used propensity score matching to compare cases, a more sophisticated statistical technique than the regression analysis used in
earlier studies. Id at 227.
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similar biases.372 Problematic intake concerns about girls were especially prevalent for black girls.373 In one experiment, identifying
children as black led probation officers to view children as “less
immature and more violent, . . . more culpable, more likely to
reoffend, and more deserving of punishment” than children with
identical facts but no racial identification.374
Judicial review of agency charging decisions could address
some of these concerns. Deviating from agency protocol—by commenting on a child’s physical appearance or failing to ask about
an abuse or neglect history—would be an important factor in determining if the agency arbitrarily and capriciously determined
that the child was in need of family-court intervention. More systemically, agencies should be required to report aggregate statistics regarding disparities. If those statistics show that race or gender rather than individual child or family factors shaped intake
decisions, that should also affect a determination whether the
agency has acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
Nonetheless, an agency model cannot itself address all disparities. As Professor Tamar Birckhead has pointed out, consideration of social factors could likely be a recipe for creating socioeconomic disparities because poor and black children are likely to
have disproportionate amounts of social needs and thus be more
likely to be seen by officials as in need of more intervention.375 But
looking only at whether a crime occurred, and not whether a particular child needs court intervention, would both undermine the
family court’s rehabilitative purpose and allow disparities in
identifying and referring crimes to create disparities in familycourt involvement. And evaluating whether a prosecution is necessary to serve a child’s needs—and thus evaluating whether
other agencies can more effectively intervene—could help reduce
the large disparities present in overall referrals to family court.376

372 See generally George S. Bridges and Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of Juvenile Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63
Am Sociological Rev 554 (1998).
373 Kempf-Leonard, The Conundrum of Girls and Juvenile Justice Processing at 501
(cited in note 367).
374 Sandra Graham and Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes
about Adolescent Offenders, 28 L & Hum Behav 483, 496 (2004).
375 See generally Tamar Birckhead, Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38 Wash U
J L & Pol 53 (2012).
376 Nationally, authorities refer black children to family court at a relative rate 2.4
times greater than they refer white children. See Investigation of the St. Louis County
Family Court at *40 (cited in note 19).
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D. More Democratic Accountability
Perhaps counterintuitively, state agencies can be more democratically accountable than locally elected prosecutors’ offices.
State agencies’ power is granted by statute—which state legislatures can amend to reform agencies. State agencies also depend
on the legislature for budget appropriations and are subject to
legislative oversight procedures.377 State agencies are subject to
state administrative-procedure laws and public reporting requirements.378 State agencies are generally supervised by governors,379 who can be held responsible for their successes or failures.
Agency oversight mechanisms may be imperfect—juvenile
justice and child protection rarely rises to the top of legislative or
gubernatorial agendas—but they are superior to existing mechanisms for local prosecutors. Even if voters are unlikely to elect
legislators or governors based on their handling of juvenile justice
and child protection issues, the various inter- and intrabranch accountability mechanisms just listed can provide meaningful paths
to democratic accountability. Those mechanisms are lacking for
local elected prosecutors’ offices. While state departments of juvenile justice can be subject to detailed legislative oversight,380 local
elections provide prosecutors’ offices with their own independent
power base and thus insulate them from legislative or gubernatorial oversight.381 In addition, both judicial intake officers and
elected prosecutors are generally exempt from state
administrative-procedure laws—the former because they are part
of the judicial branch and the latter because they are not regular
state administrative agencies. Absent such procedures, there are

377 Professor David Freeman Engstrom has made a similar point comparing agency
enforcement to private enforcement actions: “[P]ublic enforcers are politically accountable
actors. Private enforcers are not.” Engstrom, 123 Yale L J at 638 (cited in note 67).
378 See, for example, DC Code § 4-1303.03(b)(10) (requiring detailed annual reporting
from the District of Columbia’s child protection agency).
379 See, for example, SC Code Ann § 63-19-320 (empowering the governor to appoint
the director of the Department of Juvenile Justice, with the advice and consent of the state
senate, and to fire the director).
380 See, for example, House Legislative Oversight Committee, Department of Juvenile
Justice (South Carolina Legislature), archived at http://perma.cc/AJ3F-BVYK (listing
meetings, public input, and committee investigations).
381 See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the
Threat of Tyranny, 86 Iowa L Rev 393, 451 (2001).
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few mechanisms to hold them accountable for or provide public
input into the procedures used to recommend prosecution or not.382
Local prosecutors’ elections are weak substitutes for accountability mechanisms regarding state agencies. Local democratic
accountability for family-court cases is particularly weak because
family-court cases are often seen as less important than adult
cases383 and are less likely to gain local media or voters’ attention
than more severe crimes. Those cases are also confidential, reducing the ability of the public to hold prosecutors accountable.384
Moreover, local prosecutors are more likely to be elected on a
“tough-on-crime” platform385 that fails to give equal weight to the
juvenile justice system’s rehabilitative goals, and many county
elections may give greater weight to voters in richer and whiter
areas than the neighborhoods in which a disproportionate number of people affected by cases filed by prosecutors live.386
In addition, recent law-and-political-science scholarship has
shown that local prosecutors are not as democratically accountable as their local elections might suggest. Residential political polarization renders many local elections noncompetitive.387 Preliminary empirical research suggests that local crime and conviction
rates do not actually affect district attorney elections.388 Another
study found that the “overwhelming majority” of elected prosecutors run unopposed389 and that turnout rates are particularly

382 See Pfaff, Locked In at 70 (cited in note 58) (describing how the “mishmash” of
authority between local elected prosecutors, local jails, and state prisons diminishes oversight of local prosecutors’ decisions).
383 See Mears, The Front End of Juvenile Court at 581 (cited in note 18) (explaining
that juvenile crimes have traditionally been seen as less important than crimes committed
by adults, but that in recent decades “juvenile crime has garnered greater attention from
the public and policy makers”)
384 See Davis, 86 Iowa L Rev at 443 (cited in note 381) (“[T]he electoral process for
state and local prosecutors is an effective accountability measure only in the unlikely
event that the electorate becomes aware of the abuse.”).
385 See Davis, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor at 166 (cited
in note 58).
386 See Pfaff, Locked In at 7 (cited in note 58).
387 See generally David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City
Council Elections?: The Role of Election Law, 23 J L & Polit 419 (2007).
388 See Juleyka Lantigua-Williams, Are Prosecutors the Key to Justice Reform? Given
Their Autonomy—Only If They Want to Be (The Atlantic, May 18, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/V7NL-NA9X.
389 American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon, Roadblocks to Reform: District
Attorneys, Elections, and the Criminal Justice Status Quo *4 (2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/MU6U-RPRC.
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low.390 As a result, local prosecutor elections can be determined by
a closed group of political party insiders or powerful interest
groups like police unions. That is not a system that generally will
provide democratic accountability. In particular, that is not a system likely to hold prosecutors accountable to the competing goals
of the juvenile justice or child protection systems, which are not
likely to figure prominently in election campaigns.
E.

Better Agency Counseling

Counseling is particularly important in agencies, as it can
help ensure fidelity in individual cases to agency policy, and the
literature regarding government attorneys has consistently concluded that agency attorneys are best suited to fulfill that function. Accordingly, counseling functions have historically always
resided in federal agencies,391 even when the DOJ centralized
much of the federal government’s litigation authority.392 There is,
of course, overlap between litigation and counseling functions.393
Professors Elizabeth Chambliss and Dana Remus have found
that, recognizing this overlap, some states grant some agencies
the ability to litigate some matters on their own behalf.394 Such
grants of agency litigation authority make particular sense when
an agency’s overall programs and goals closely relate to its litigation activity.395 In such cases, the overlap between counseling and
litigation is so significant that dividing it would risk harming the
quality of either function.
Juvenile justice and child protection law are fields in which
counseling and prosecution functions significantly overlap—
determining which cases to file and which cases to handle outside
of court relates to the agencies’ core missions. Litigating those
cases becomes a significant amount of the work of such agencies—

390 Pfaff, Locked In at 141–42 (cited in note 58) (noting low turnout rates and connecting “voter apathy” to elected prosecutors’ longevity in office).
391 See Chambliss and Remus, 84 Fordham L Rev at 2049 (cited in note 70) (“The core
function of the agency general counsel is to advise the agency.”); Devins and Herz, 5 U Pa J
Const L at 568–69 (cited in note 67); Herz, The Attorney Particular at 143 (cited in note 325).
392 See Devins and Herz, 5 U Pa J Const L at 568–69 (cited in note 67).
393 See Chambliss and Remus, 84 Fordham L Rev at 2049 (cited in note 70) (“Naturally, there is some overlap between the two functions.”).
394 Id.
395 Devins has made this point in reference to independent federal agencies: “Since court
action is a critical component of an agency’s regulatory agenda, litigation authority would
seem to constitute an essential attribute of agency independence.” Devins, Toward an
Understanding of Legal Policy-Making at Independent Agencies at 185 (cited in note 71).
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measured both by the amount of resources such litigation requires and how such litigation serves as the decision point for
resource-intensive agency action (such as placing a child into a
juvenile justice facility or a foster home). And an essential piece
of the agency’s work is to match the children and families entering the agencies’ front door (through child protection or delinquency litigation) with the various services the agencies offer
those families. Once litigation is chosen, the agency must address
various questions that arise after adjudication, such as the appropriate placement for a child committed to a juvenile justice
agency, whether a foster child can reunify with a parent or requires a new family, and, if a new family is necessary, what legal
arrangements for such families are most appropriate.396
F.

More Equality across Geographical Boundaries

Agency authority also better achieves goals of equal treatment within states because agencies work across states while
prosecutors are elected on a local level. Even when child protection or juvenile justice agencies have county offices, those offices
sit within a statewide administrative structure, providing some
tools for statewide accountability397—while locally elected prosecutors do not encounter such tools. But even in those states,
agency authority will be no less consistent across the state than
elected prosecutor authority, as the latter is based on each local
prosecutor’s office.
A perennial concern in juvenile justice has been “justice by
geography,”398 and inconsistent treatment by jurisdiction is particularly problematic when a “sanction is so severe and the stakes
so high.”399 The sanction at issue in delinquency cases—the possibility of being incarcerated in a state institution indefinitely, up
396 See Josh Gupta-Kagan, The New Permanency, 19 UC Davis J Juv L & Pol 1, 11–
26 (2015) (describing a continuum of permanency options); Herring, 24 U Toledo L Rev at
673 (cited in note 213) (describing the need for attorneys to counsel child protection agencies regarding permanency); Silverthorn, Agency Representation in Child Welfare
Proceedings at 757–58 (cited in note 324) (describing counseling as “one of the agency attorney’s biggest roles”).
397 The precise types of such accountability and the variations of state agency oversight over county agencies are beyond the scope of this Article.
398 See, for example, US Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Disproportionate Minority Contact Technical Assistance Manual 2-7
to -8 (4th ed July 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/R46J-FLN5. See also generally Barry
C. Feld, Justice by Geography: Urban, Suburban, and Rural Variations in Juvenile Justice
Administration, 82 J Crim L & Crimin 156 (1991).
399 Devins and Herz, 5 U Pa J Const L at 600 (cited in note 67).

2018]

Rethinking Family-Court Prosecutors

823

to one’s twenty-first birthday, with a stigma analogous to that imposed by a criminal conviction400—makes this same concern apply
to juvenile delinquency cases. A similar point can be made regarding the sanctions and stigma of child protection cases.401 Devins
and Herz have argued that agency litigation control is “likely to
increase [consistency of government legal positions], if anything,
because the litigating position will be the agency’s alone, without
mediation or massaging by DOJ.”402 Lawyers represent agencies,
not individual agency employees, and so the lawyer can take on a
particularly important role in ensuring that the caseworker’s actions comport with agency policy.403
The case is even stronger when applied to the state delinquency and child protection system and the choice is between
an agency model and a different elected prosecutor’s office in
every county. The latter creates a “mishmash of independent,
often competitive” power centers, with the effect of limiting
oversight of charging decisions.404 The former provides a structure with a greater ability to impose oversight and regularity
on intake decisions.
CONCLUSION
Family-court prosecutors have a different history and function than their criminal analogs, and prosecutorial discretion is
as important in delinquency and child protection cases as in criminal cases. Thus, family-court prosecutors deserve close study.
They differ from criminal prosecutors in their purposes, which
mix protecting individuals and the public from crime and child
abuse and neglect with juvenile law’s historical focus on rehabilitating child and parent offenders. And they differ in the role of
administrative agencies that are charged with pursuing those
mixed goals.
Those administrative agencies indicate the promise for a
more coherent administrative structure. Those agencies have relative expertise regarding the cases they see and regarding the
400 Gault recognized that delinquency cases impose “only slightly less stigma” than
criminal cases. Gault, 387 US at 23–24.
401 See Josh Gupta-Kagan, Beyond Law Enforcement: Camreta v. Greene, Child
Protection Investigations, and the Need to Reform the Fourth Amendment Special Needs
Doctrine, 87 Tulane L Rev 353, 418–20 (2012) (discussing the stigma of child protection
cases).
402 Devins and Herz, 5 U Pa J Const L at 574 (cited in note 67).
403 See Laver, Foundations for Success at 112–14 (cited in note 218).
404 Pfaff, Locked In at 70 (cited in note 58).

824

The University of Chicago Law Review

[85:743

services available, depending on the case. They are thus best positioned to exercise prosecutorial discretion.
Enacting a reform agenda involves several core steps. First,
states should eliminate the vestiges of their pre-Gault intake
structure. States should prevent private individuals from initiating court cases. Judicial-branch employees should have no role in
determining which cases are filed and which are diverted.
Second, states should create comprehensive agencies with an
understanding of how cases proceed through a full range of
options—and with the responsibility for administering those options. Most child protection agencies already are structured in
this way, so the biggest change would be in juvenile justice, and
would mean shifting intake and probation services to departments of juvenile justice.405
Third, states should grant these comprehensive agencies
prosecutorial authority—including the authority to determine
whether to file and prosecute, divert, or dismiss a case. Especially
once these agencies have the ability to see the full range of options
available to respond to delinquency or child protection cases, they
are best positioned to determine which cases need court intervention and which do not. As a corollary, elected prosecutors should
not have a role in these matters.406
Fourth, agencies’ exercise of prosecutorial decisionmaking
should be treated like other administrative decisions—and subject to judicial review. Agencies should have discretion, of course,
but they should exercise that discretion within boundaries. They
should be free, for instance, to evaluate the different interventions provided to a fifteen-year-old who has committed a string of
petty nonviolent offenses and determine that the child’s continued misconduct warrants court intervention. But they should not
be free to avoid analysis of whether the child had the opportunity
to receive appropriate special education services, for instance.
405 This structure would not address other important questions that are beyond the
scope of this Article. For example, children’s Fifth Amendment rights would need protection, so juvenile justice agencies engaging in intake interviews should be prohibited from
using any disclosures by a child in prosecuting that child. Such a rule echoes statutory
protections already in place in many states. See, for example, SC Code Ann § 63-191010(A). See also Birckhead, 46 Tex Tech L Rev at 167–68 (cited in note 19). In addition,
a strong argument exists that children should have the right to counsel for some intake
proceedings. Id at 166–71.
406 An exception should exist in determining when to seek waiver of family-court jurisdiction to prosecute a child in criminal court. Such decisions police the border between
juvenile and adult court and, in my structure, between agencies and elected prosecutors
exercising prosecutorial discretion.
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These reforms would achieve multiple important goals. They
would modernize family-court procedures. They would provide
important and meaningful limits on prosecutorial discretion—
limits that have been difficult to identify for criminal prosecutors.
And it would create a structure that is more likely to further juvenile justice and child protection systems’ policy goals.

